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NOTES
Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes:
Independent Candidate Access to Public Television Debates
Once again, perennial candidate and self-described "Christ
Supremacist" Ralph Forbes threw his hat into Arkansas's political
ring, this time as an independent candidate for Congress.' His
Republican and Democratic opponents had already been invited to a
televised debate hosted by the state's public television station, the
Arkansas Educational Television Commission ("AETC").2 When
Forbes asked to participate, AETC quickly rejected him.' That
denial prompted Forbes to file suit against AETC,4 claiming that the
1. See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633, 1638 (1998).
Arkansas law allows citizens to qualify as candidates by submitting petitions with the
signatures of at least three percent of the qualified electors in the district in which the
candidate wishes to run for office. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-7-103(b)(1) (Michie 1993 &
Supp. 1997). Potential candidates do not need to collect more than 2000 signatures. See
id. By August 1992, Forbes had collected a sufficient number of signatures to qualify as a
congressional candidate in the Third District. See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1638. Forbes is a
self-described "Christ Supremacist," who "advocates the preservation of the white race
and returning [African-Americans] to Africa." Peggy Harris, White Separatist Hopes to
Run Graphic Anti-Abortion Ads, ASSOCIATED PRESS POL. SERV., Sept. 5, 1992, available
in 1992 WL 5140328, at *3. Forbes, a former American Nazi, unsuccessfully campaigned
to be Arkansas's lieutenant governor in 1986 and 1990. See id. In 1988, he was involved in
David Duke's failed presidential campaign. See id. For more information on Forbes's
background, see David S. Broder, A Close Governor's Race in Arkansas?: Longtime
Incumbent Clinton to Face Ex-Democratin FallShowdown, WASH. POST, May 31, 1990, at
A10; Crime of Silence: Republican National Committee Does Not Act to Prevent
Klansmen Nomination, NATION, June 25, 1990, at 25; Frank Fellone, Editorial, A
Necessary Function, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETtE, Oct. 13, 1997, at B7, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Arkdem File; Maralee Schwartz & David S. Broder, Harris Backed
in Arkansas GOPRunoff, WASH. POST, June 10,1990, at A7.
2- See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1637-38. In 1992, AETC hosted one debate for the
candidates in each of Arkansas's four congressional elections, as well as one debate for the
candidates competing in the state's senatorial election. See id. Each debate lasted one'
hour, allotting 53 minutes for questions and answers. See id.
3. See id. at 1638. AETC's executive director explained that Forbes's request was
denied based on" 'a bona fide journalistic judgment that our viewers would be best served
by limiting the debate' " to the major party candidates. Id. (quoting Brief for the
Petitioner at 61a, Forbes, (No. 96-779)). AETC did not consider Forbes a "serious"
candidate. See Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Television Communication Network Found., 22
F.3d 1423, 1426 (8th Cir. 1994) (en banc). Forbes alleged that a representative of AETC
told him that the station would show a rerun of the television program St. Elsewhere
instead of airing a debate that included Forbes. See id.
4. See Forbes,118 S. Ct. at 1638.
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5
station, a state agency, had violated his First Amendment rights.
Forbes's claim pitted a political candidate's interest in free speech
against a public television station's interest in its autonomy and
journalistic freedom. In weighing these interests, the courts not only
had to confront philosophic constitutional questions concerning the
First Amendment but also had to face the practical issues involved in
producing a televised debate.
This Note first discusses Forbes's attempt to be included in the
AETC debate and the procedural history of Forbes's battle with
AETC in the federal courts.6 It reviews the United States Supreme
Court's recent disposition of Forbes's claim in Arkansas Educational
Television Commission v. Forbes.7 After exploring the history and
modem application of the public forum doctrine in the Supreme
Court, the Note discusses criticisms of the modem forum doctrine
and proposes that the Court's reliance on the doctrine in assessing
the speech interests of a candidate wishing to join a debate sponsored
by a public television station is particularly troubling.' Finally, the
Note suggests that the Court in the future can analyze such a claim
through a balancing test that weighs the individual's speech interests
against the usual use of the government's property.10
Three days before the AETC debate was scheduled to take
place, Forbes filed his suit, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief
against his exclusion from the debate." He claimed that he was
entitled to engage in the debate under the Federal Communications
Act 2 and the First Amendment. 13 Though both the district court and

5. See id.
6. See infra notes 11-43 and accompanying text.
7. 118 S. Ct. 1633 (1988); see infra notes 44-84 and accompanying text.

8. See infra notes 85-204 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 205-304 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 305-25 and accompanying text.
11. See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1638. After AETC initially refused to include Forbes in
the debate, he called the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") to file a
complaint. See Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Television Communication Network Found., 22
F.3d 1423, 1426 (8th Cir. 1994) (en banc). Allegedly, the person he spoke with at the FCC
told him to file a formal FCC complaint, although such a complaint would "be a waste of
time." Id. Heeding this advice, Forbes wrote a letter to the FCC asking for a quick
rejection of his claim. See id. When the FCC responded by writing a letter explaining the
complaint process, Forbes filed for the preliminary injunction. See id. Forbes, however,
had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, so the district court dismissed his claims
under 47 U.S.C. § 315 of the Federal Communications Act. See Forbes, 118 S.Ct. at 1638.
Forbes's claim against AETC also included a request for damages. See id.
12. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1994). Section 315 states that "[i]f any licensee shall permit any
person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting
station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in
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the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals denied his request for an
injunction, 4 Forbes continued to pursue his claim against AETC.
Following the election, the district court dismissed Forbes's
complaint for failure to state a claim. 5 The court held that a
" 'political candidate does not have a "constitutional right of
broadcast access to air his views."' "I6
Sitting en banc, the Eighth Circuit agreed that candidates
generally do not have a constitutional right to "demand air time."' 7
The court held, however, that Forbes had a qualified right of access

the use of such broadcasting station." Id. Forbes claimed that under this provision, he
had a right to participate in the debate. See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1638.
13. See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1638.
14. See Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Television Communication Network Found., 22
F.3d at 1427. For the press reaction to these decisions, see Appeals Judge Denies Forbes'
Motion, ASSOCIATED PRESS POL. SERV., Oct. 21, 1992, available in 1992 WL 5148273;
Independent Candidate Loses Another Bid to Get in' Debate, ASSOCIATED PRESS POL.
SERV., Oct. 22, 1992, available in 1992 WL 5148548; Joel Williams, Independent
Candidate'sRequest Denied by Federal Court, ASSOCIATED PRESS POL. SERV., Oct. 20,
1992, available in 1992 WL 5147631.
During the AETC debate, the two major party candidates discussed their views on
taxes, the line-item veto, a balanced budget amendment, and family values. See
Candidates Agree Raising Taxes Not the Way to Salvage Economy, ASSOCIATED PRESS
POL. SERV., Oct. 22, 1992, available in 1992 WL 5148506, at *1-3. While the candidates
debated, Forbes attempted to enter the AETC studio, but following requests from AETC
representatives, Forbes left the building. See id. at *3-4.
The day before the election, Forbes amended his complaint and added two private
television stations as defendants.
See Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Television
Communication Network Found., 22 F.3d at 1427. Forbes's claim against the private
stations centered on their refusal to air a campaign ad concerning abortion at any time
other than during late night, safe-harbor hours. See id.; see also Forbes Claims Stations
Plan to Squelch His Ads, ASSOCIATED PRESS POL. SERV., Oct. 30, 1992, available in 1992
WL 5150640 (describing the anti-abortion ads that Forbes sought to air); Harris, supra
note 1, at *1-2 (describing Forbes's efforts to raise money to show the ads). In his claim,
Forbes alleged that the networks were engaged in a criminal conspiracy and had violated
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985, as well as 47 U.S.C. § 315. See Forbes v. Arkansas
Educ. Television Communication Network Found., 22 F.3d at 1427. As he pursued his
claims in court, Forbes also continued to pursue political office in Arkansas. See Forbes'
Bid for 1994 Ballot Dismissed, ASSOCIATED PRESS POL. SERV., June 27, 1995, available in
1995 WL 6733301, at *3.In 1994, the state denied Forbes's effort to qualify as a candidate
because he did not meet the procedural requirements to get his name on the ballot. See id.
at *2.
15. See Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Television Communication Network Found., 22
F.3d at 1427 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)).
16. Id. at 1428 (quoting DeYoung v. Patten, 898 F.2d 628, 632 (8th Cir. 1990) (quoting
Kennedy for President Comm. v. FCC, 636 F.2d 417, 430-31 (D.C. Cir. 1980))). The
district court also held that Forbes failed to state a claim under any of his statutory
complaints. See id. at 1427. Among its other holdings, the district court's dismissal stated
that no private right of action exists under 47 U.S.C. § 315. See id.
17. Id. at 1428 (citing Kennedy for PresidentComm., 636 F.2d at 430-31).
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to AETC's debate under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 18
Because AETC is a state agency, the court analyzed Forbes's claim
using the public forum doctrine.1 9

Citizen's claims to First Amendment rights on public property
are analyzed using the public forum doctrine, which classifies the
property in question into one of the following three categories:
traditional public forum, limited public forum, or nonpublic forum."
A traditional public forum is a place that historically has been open
to citizens for public debate and free expression. 21 A limited public
forum can be created by the government on public property that
traditionally has not been open to free expression by the public.22 To
create such a forum, the government must intend to create a forum
for "use by certain groups or for the discussion of certain subjects."'
All property that is not a traditional or limited public forum is
classified as a nonpublic forum.2 4

Although the Eighth Circuit readily acknowledged that the
debate was not a true public forum,21 it noted that the debate may
have been a limited public forum.216 The court explained that if the
debate was a limited public forum, AETC must have a "sufficient
government interest" for excluding Forbes from the debate.27 The
18. See id. The court overruled DeYoung v. Patten, 898 F.2d 628, 632 (8th Cir. 1990),
which held that a political candidate does not have a right to appear in public television
debates beyond rights established under § 315. See Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Television
Communication Network Found., 22 F.3d at 1427.
19. See Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Television Communication Network Found., 22
F.3d at 1428-30. Ironically, from the court's opinion, it appears that AETC "suggest[ed]
that the case should be governed by public-forum analysis." Id. at 1429. This suggestion
provided the Eighth Circuit with the rationale for reversing the district court's decision in
favor of AETC. See id. at 1429-30.
20. See Forbes,118 S. Ct. at 1641-42.
21. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); see
also infra notes 169-72 and accompanying text (discussing the traditional public forum).
22. See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1641; see also infra notes 50-53 and accompanying text
(discussing the limited public forum). Courts use the term "designated public forum"
interchangeably with "limited public forum." Compare Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1641
(describing a designated public forum), with Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Television
Communication Network Found., 22 F.3d at 1429 (describing a limited public forum).
23. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7.
24. See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1642; see also infra notes 54-55 and accompanying text
(discussing the nonpublic forum).
25. See Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Television Communication Network Found., 22
F.3d at 1429 ("Where is no unlimited right of access to the airwaves.").
26. See id. The court defined a "limited public forum" as property that normally is
not accessible for free speech, yet the government has acquiesced to open the property for
such expression for "a limited period of time, a limited topic, or a limited class of
speakers." Ma.(citations omitted).
27. Id. (citing Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293
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court also recognized that the debate might have been a nonpublic
forum," in which case Forbes could have been excluded if his

exclusion was "'reasonable in light of the purpose'" of the debate
and was not based on his views.29

The Eighth Circuit held that

whether the debate was a limited public forum or nonpublic forum
was a question of fact to be determined at trial.3" Accordingly, it
31
remanded the case for trial on that issue.
On remand, the district court instructed the jury that the debate

was a nonpublic forum as a matter of law.32 The jury found by special
verdict that AETC did not exclude Forbes because of political
pressure or his political views,33 and the district court entered
judgment for AETC.34 Forbes appealed again, claiming that the

debate was a limited public forum and that AETC's reason for
excluding him was legally insufficient.3 5
(1984)). The court explained that if the debate was a limited public forum, Forbes had a
protected right to participate because he was a member of the class of speakers for whom
the forum was created (i.e., candidates for the Third Congressional District seat) and
because he sought to speak on the topic of the debate (i.e., which candidate should be
elected to the House of Representatives). See id.
2& See id. The court defined a "nonpublic forum" as "property not usually
compatible with expressive activity." Id (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense &
Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 803(1985)). The court also pointed out that Forbes could
not be excluded because of his political views if the debate was a nonpublic forum. See id.
29. Id (quoting Cornelius,473 U.S. at 806).
30. See id. at 1429-30. At the time of the court's decision, AETC had not filed an
answer to Forbes's complaint, and, consequently, it had not given any reason for excluding
him from the debate. See id. at 1430.
The dissenting opinion concluded that AETC's debate was a nonpublic forum
because its format "was not compatible with either unrestricted public access or with
unrestricted access by all of the legally qualified candidates." Id. at 1431-32 (McMillian,
J., dissenting). The dissent contended that AETC probably sought to establish a
traditional debate format, and if AETC limited the debate to either the major-party
candidates or the candidates with the most support, AETC's decision would be acceptable
as viewpoint-neutral. See id. at 1432 (McMillian, J., dissenting). Notably, the rationale of
Judge McMillian's dissent is remarkably similar to the Supreme Court's final disposition
of Forbes's claim. See infra notes 48-72 and accompanying text. One commentator
criticized the Eighth Circuit decision and the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari of the
injunction ruling for leading to uncertainty regarding the composition of public television
debates and the editorial authority of such stations. See Lyle Denniston, Who Can Join
Public Television Debates?,AM. JOURNALISM REV., Jan./Feb. 1995, at 50, 50.
31. See Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Television Communication Network Found., 22
F.3d at 1429-30.
32. See Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 93 F.3d 497, 500-01 (8th Cir.
1996), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 1633 (1998); see also Jury Finds Against Forbes in Suit Against
Public TV Network, ASSOCIATED PRESS POL. SERV., June 7, 1995, available in 1995 WL
6730810 (noting that the jury deliberations lasted under two hours).
33. See Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 93 F.3d at 501.
34. See id. at 499.
35. See id. at 500.
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On appeal, a panel of the Eighth Circuit held that the debate was
a limited public forum from which Forbes should not have been
excluded.36 The court determined that the relevant forum for
analysis was the debate-not the television station or the Third
Congressional District.37 The court held that the debate was a limited
public forum because the government (through AETC) created a
forum for a limited class of speakers (candidates for a specific
congressional seat).18 Finally, the court turned its attention to the
"real issue"-the legal sufficiency of AETC's reason for excluding
Forbes, which AETC characterized as having been based on its
conclusion that Forbes was not a politically viable candidate. 39 The
court declared that voters, not AETC or any government
employees, 4 were the ultimate arbiters of Forbes's political
viability.41 Forbes, as a qualified candidate for the Third District, was
equal with the major party candidates in the eyes of the law. 42 As a

36. See id. at 504-05. On appeal, Forbes challenged not only the district court's ruling
on the First Amendment issue but also several of its procedural rulings. See id. at 501-02.
The Eighth Circuit did not upset the lower court's rulings on the procedural issues. See id.
The Eighth Circuit also discussed whether the issue of how to classify the debate within
the public forum analysis was the responsibility of the judge or jury at trial. See id. at 502.
While recognizing that the classification was a mixed question of law and fact, the court
explained that the issue of who should determine the classification at trial was "of no
practical significance" once the case was appealed because the appellate court's review is
de novo. Id. at 502-03 (citations omitted).
37. See id. at 503.
38. See id. at 504.

39. See id. at 500, 504-05. At different stages of the Forbes controversy, the television
station offered different reasons for Forbes's exclusion. Compare id. at 500 (explaining
that Forbes was excluded because he was not a "viable" political candidate), with Jury
Finds Against Forbes in Suit Against Public TV Network, supra note 32 (reporting that

AETC's attorney justified the decision by saying, "'We determined [that the major-party
candidates] were the two candidates that AETN's viewers would want to see and hear
debate.... This was classic editorial judgment of the kind that the free press has the
responsibility and the obligation to make.' "). These differences were immaterial to the
ultimate outcome of the case. See infra notes 68-72 and accompanying text. AETC
oversees the Arkansas Educational Television Network, sometimes referred to as
"A1&E
TN."1

40. The Eighth Circuit recognized that AETC's decision to exclude Forbes was the
same journalistic judgment made by newspeople everyday. See Forbes v. Arkansas Educ.
Television Comm'n, 93 F.3d at 505. But the court emphasized that "the people making
this judgment were not ordinary journalists: they were employees of government." Id.
AETC's commissioners are "appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of
the Senate." ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-3-102(b)(1) (Michie 1993).
41. See Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 93 F.3d at 504-05. The court
noted that "[tlhe question of political viability is, indeed, so subjective, so arguable, so
susceptible of variation in individual opinion, as to provide no secure basis for the exercise
of governmental power consistent with the First Amendment." Id. at 505.
42. See id. at 504.
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result, the court held that AETC's political viability standard was
"neither compelling nor narrowly tailored" and that AETC had
violated Forbes's First Amendment rights.43
In an opinion by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court reversed

the Eighth Circuit.'

At the outset of its opinion, the Court stated

that the public forum doctrine generally should not be applied to the

programming decisions of public television stations. 45 The Court,
however, recognized that political debates were the exception to this
rule. 46 The Court justified this exception by explaining that the
nature of a debate is to serve as a forum for political discourse by the
candidates, not a station's employees, and that debates play an

important role in the American electoral process. 47
With both parties in the case recognizing that the debate did not

constitute a traditional public forum,48 the Court considered whether
the debate served as a limited public forum or a nonpublic forum.4 9

The Court noted that a limited public forum can be created by the
government on property that traditionally has not been open for
public discourse. 50 The key to assessing whether such a forum has

been established is the government's intent-"the government must
intend to make the property 'generally available' to a class of

43. Id. at 505.
44. See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1638. The majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Thomas, and Breyer. See id. at 1637. Justice
Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Souter and Ginsburg joined. See id.
(Stevens, J., dissenting). For news reports and analysis discussing the Court's opinion, see
Joan Biskupic, Public Broadcasters Given Choice in CandidateDebates: Supreme Court,
6-3, Says TV Stations May Control Access, WASH. POST, May 19, 1998, at A2; Bernard
James, In Two Cases, Court OKs Speech Limits: The 'Forbes' and 'NEA' Decisions
Approve GreaterGovernmentalControl Over Forms of Speech, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 10, 1998,
at B15; Terry Lemons, Court Sides with AETN on Debates, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETtE,
May 19, 1998, at Al, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arkdem File; Dan Trigoboff,
Public TV Wins in High Court,BROADCASTING & CABLE, May 25, 1998, at 34; see also
Timothy B. Dyk & Thomas M. Fisher, Courtside, COMM. LAW., Winter 1998, at 24, 24-25
(discussing the oral arguments before the Supreme Court).
45. See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1640.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 1641. The Court reaffirmed its precedents that defined public forums by
objective characteristics, such as whether the property historically had been recognized as
a place of assembly and debate. See id. (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)). If the property is a public forum, the
government can exclude speakers only if the exclusion "'serve[s] a compelling state
interest and ...is narrowly drawn to achieve that interest.'" Id. (quoting Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,800 (1985)).
49. See id.
50. See id.
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speakers."'" If the government has created a limited public forum,
then it can only exclude speakers within the stipulated class according
to the same standards governing a traditional public forum." Thus,
the Court will strictly scrutinize the government's decision to exclude
a speaker from a limited public forum. 3 Finally, the Court explained
that all other government properties, that is, properties not classified
as traditional or limited public fora, are either nonpublic fora or not
fora at all. 4 The government can exclude speakers from a nonpublic
forum if the exclusion is reasonable in light of the property's purpose
and is not designed merely to suppress the speaker's opinions. 55
The Court then offered some guidance on how to distinguish a
limited public forum from a nonpublic forum.56 Concluding that the
critical distinction is whether the government has provided "general
access" or "selective access" to the property, the Court explained that
"[a] designated public forum is not created when the government
allows selective access for individual speakers rather than general
access for a class of speakers."'5 7 Furthermore, the government does
not create a limited public forum if it "reserve[s] eligibility for access
to the forum to a particular class of speakers, whose members must
then, as individuals, 'obtain permission' to use it."58
Using this model, the Court considered whether the AETC
debate was designed to provide general or specific access to
government property.5 9 The Court noted that the debate was not
designed to be an open-microphone session that generally would be
available to all candidates.' Instead, AETC merely had restricted
eligibility to participate in the debate to one district's candidates.61
Then, AETC made candidate-by-candidate determinations about
51. Id. at 1642 (citation omitted) (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 264
(1981)).
52. See id. at 1641.
53. See id. (citing United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 726-27 (1990) (plurality
opinion); Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802). As in a traditional public forum, a limited public
forum allows the government to place reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on
citizens' ability to speak, but content-based exclusions "must be narrowly drawn to
effectuate a compelling state interest." Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46. This level of
scrutiny places greater restraint on government's control of its property than the
discretion given to regulate nonpublic fora. See id.
54. See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1641.
55. See id. (citing Cornelius,473 U.S. at 800).
56. See id. at 1641-43.
57. Id. at 1642 (citation omitted).
58. Id. (citation omitted).
59. See id. at 1642-43.
60. See id. at 1642.
61. See id.
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The Court emphasized that ample evidence existed to support the

jury's finding and that Forbes had presented no "serious" argument
that AETC had not acted in good faith.7 ' In the end, the Court held
that AETC's decision to exclude Forbes from the debate was "a

reasonable, viewpoint-neutral exercise of journalistic discretion
consistent with the First Amendment."'
In dissent, Justice Stevens agreed with the Court's holding that

public television stations are not obligated by the Constitution to give
every candidate access to the debates they host.73 He contended that
in this case, however, AETC's refusal to include Forbes in the debate

violated his constitutional rights.74 Justice Stevens expressed
uncertainty about the validity of AETC's criteria for inviting
characterizing AETC's decision as "standardless" and
candidates,
"ad hoc."' He noted that Forbes had demonstrated greater political
viability than candidates invited by AETC to participate in the
debates it sponsored for other congressional districts.7 6 Justice
71. See id. at 1644.
72. Id.
73. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
75. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
76. See id. at 1645 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Forbes had been "a serious contender" in
the 1986 and 1990 campaigns to be the Republican nominee for Lieutenant Governor. Id.
(Stevens, J., dissenting). In 1990, Forbes lost the nomination for lieutenant governor in a
run-off despite garnering more than 46% of the vote and winning majorities in 15 of the 16
counties that comprise the Third Congressional District. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting);
see also Robert Marquand, Which Candidates Get to Speak on TV?, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Oct. 9, 1997, at 1 (discussing Forbes's success in previous elections).
Meanwhile, Republican Terry Hayes was included in the AETC-sponsored debate for the
First Congressional District, even though he had "virtually no chance of winning" and on
election day garnered only 30.2% of the vote. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1645 n.6 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). In addition, AETC invited Republican Dennis Scott to participate in the
Second District's debate despite raising a mere $6000 for his campaign (which was less
than Forbes) and losing to an incumbent representative who won more than 74% of the
vote. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted that AETC's decision to
exclude Forbes was particularly unfortunate because the eventual winner of the 1992
congressional election, Republican Tim Hutchinson, received a slight majority (50.22%)
and beat his opponent, Democrat John VanWinlde, by less than 8000 votes. See id. at 1645
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Election Results Table, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 1992, at A34.
Consequently, Forbes needed "to divert only a handful of votes" from Hutchinson to have
caused his defeat. See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1645 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens
suggested that AETC's decision "may have determined the outcome of the election." Id.
(Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Biskupic, supra note 44, at A2 (noting that third-party
candidates who attract public attention can affect the outcome of elections by luring voters
away from the major-party candidates). Forbes may have even been more well-known
than VanWinkle when the campaign began. See Meredith Oakley, Editorial, Ruling Chills
Freedom-Lovers, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, May 25, 1998, at B7, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Arkdem File. Notably, a poll conducted during the week of the AETC
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which of the eligible candidates would be invited to engage in the
debate." The Court determined that the selective access of the
AETC debate did not establish a public forum because the
government had not purposefully designated the property for general
public use. 63 Therefore, the Court held that the debate was a
nonpublic forum.'
The Court stressed that the Eighth Circuit's decision finding that
the debate was a limited public forum for all candidates would
restrict speech in campaigns. When confronted with the burden of
being forced to include all qualified candidates, public television
stations might choose not to host debates at all 6 The majority also
worried that the number of candidates that would have to be
included in a public television debate would undermine the debate's
educational value to voters. 67
Having ruled that the debate was a nonpublic forum, the Court
held that AETC did not violate Forbes's constitutional rights by
excluding him from the debate on the ground that his candidacy was
not politically viable. 6 s The Court reiterated that the district court
jury had found that Forbes's exclusion did not stem from AETC's
opposition to his views. 69 Rather, he was not invited to participate
because his campaign had failed to attract the interest of voters. 70

62. See id. at 1642-43.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 1643.
65. See id.
66. See id. The Court supported this conclusion by pointing out that Nebraska's
public television station canceled a senatorial debate following the Eighth Circuit's
decision that the debate constituted a limited public forum from which Forbes should not
have been excluded. See id.; see also C. David Kotok, Nelson, Hagel to Appear but Not
Debate at Fair, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Aug. 24, 1996, at 1, available in 1996 WL
6028916 (explaining that Nebraska Education Television canceled a political debate in
light of the Eighth Circuit's holding and the subsequent efforts of two minor party
candidates to be included in the debate); Editorial, Minor-Party Farce Denied Voters a
Debate, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Aug. 27, 1996, at 10, available in 1996 WL 6035074
(criticizing the Eighth Circuit's holding and claiming that the inclusion of minor party
candidates in Nebraska Education Television's debate would have "made a mockery of a
serious political event"). But see Third Party Candidates to Join Debate, ASSOCIATED
PRESS POL. SERV., Sept. 27, 1996, available in 1996 WL 5409402 (reporting that AETC
included an independent candidate and a candidate from the Reform Party in its Third
Congressional District debate following the Eighth Circuit's decision).
67. See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1643 (citing TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE
ON PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES, LET AMERICA DECIDE 148 (1995) [hereinafter TASK
FORCE ON DEBATES]).

68. See iL at 1643-44.
69. See id. at 1643.
70. See id. at 1643-44.
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on public expression on government-owned property dates back to
the late nineteenth century86 when the Court held that the state had

the same right to prohibit speech on public property that a owner had
to forbid it on private property." By 1939, the Court expressed a
different opinion.
In Hague v. Committee for Industrial
88 Justice Roberts wrote that the public's use of streets
Organization,
and parks "for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts
between citizens, and discussing public questions ...has, from

ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and
liberties of citizens."8 9
Until the 1960s, the Court generally continued to protect the

public's right to free expression in streets, sidewalks, and parks. The
civil rights movement, however, forced it to confront the "problems
raised by [African-American] protest in public places."9 In the wake
of two Supreme Court cases concerning civil rights protests,9
the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1713, 1718-64 (1987); Edward J.Neveril, Comment,
"Objective" Approachesto the Public Forum Doctrine: The FirstAmendment at the Mercy
of Architectural Chicanery,90 Nw. U. L. REv. 1185, 1192-1217 (1996).
86. See Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965

Sup. Cr. REV. 1, 12.
87. See Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 47-48 (1897). In Davis, the Supreme
Court reiterated Oliver Wendell Holmes's notion that" '[flor the legislature absolutely or
conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or public park is no more an
infringement of the rights of a member of the public than for the owner of a private house
to forbid it in his house.'" Id. at 47 (quoting Commonwealth v. Davis, 39 N.E. 113, 113
(Mass. 1895)). The Davis Court upheld a Boston city ordinance stipulating that people
wishing to make speeches in public areas must first receive permits from the mayor. See
id. at 48. For further discussion of Davis, see David S. Day, The End of the Public Forum
Doctrine, 78 IOWA L. REV. 143,150 (1992).
88. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
89. Id. at 515.
90. Kalven, supranote 86, at 2.
91. In Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963), the Court reviewed whether
African-American high school and college students' constitutional rights were violated
when they were arrested for breaching the peace by protesting discrimination on the
grounds of the South Carolina State House. See id. at 230. During their protest, the
students carried signs and marched in an orderly manner on the sidewalks of the State
House without obstructing any pedestrian or vehicular traffic. See id. at 231-32. After
police advised them that they would be arrested if the demonstration did not end within 15
minutes, the students began singing religious songs and The Star-SpangledBanner. See id.
at 233. Subsequently, the police arrested the students. See id. In overturning the
students' convictions, the Court noted that their protest reflected "an exercise of these
basic constitutional rights [of free speech and assembly] in their most pristine and classic
form." See id. at 235; see also Day, supranote 87, at 154-56 (discussing the Court's holding
in Edwards).
Two years later, the Court revisited the issue of government restrictions on citizens'
right to protest in public places. In Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965), the Court
invalidated the conviction of a protester who had been convicted under statutes
prohibiting breach of the peace. See id. at 551-52. The protester in Cox led a
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Stevens was particularly troubled that AETC invited all major party
candidates but excluded the only independent candidate running for
Congress in Arkansas.77 He contended that such "ad hoc" standards
provided public television stations with nearly unfettered discretion. 8
Pointing out that private stations face significant regulation when
they choose to host debates, 79 Justice Stevens argued that public
stations should face at least the same scrutiny as private stations do,
given the inherent risk of allowing a state agency to host a political

debate. 0
Finally, Justice Stevens suggested that state-sponsored television
debates "may not squarely fit within our public forum analysis."81 In
his view, decisions about debate invitations should meet at least the
same standards required for government decisions to grant permits
for parades.s2 In considering whether governments must issue
permits, the Court has previously held that applications for parade
permits must be assessed using "'narrow, objective, and definite
standards.' 83 Justice Stevens argued that public television stations
should use similar certainty and objectivity in state-sponsored
debates to avoid "arbitrary or viewpoint-based exclusions." 84
To fully appreciate the conflict in Forbes, it is useful to trace the
history of the public forum doctrine and examine its modern

application.

The struggle to define what limits the state can place

debate showed that Hutchinson trailed VanWinkle in the polls by seven percent. See
Survey Shows Tight Race with DemocratHoldingNarrow Lead, ASSOCIATED PRESS POL.
SERV., Oct. 23, 1992, availablein 1992 WL 5148639 (reporting poll results with VanWinkle
supported by 44% of people surveyed, Hutchinson 37%, Forbes 1%, and 18% undecided).
For a summary of the campaign, see Julie Stewart, Lawyer, State Representative, White
Supremacist Seek 3rd DistrictSeat, ASSOCIATED PRESS POL. SERV., Nov. 3,1992, available
in 1992 WL 5151598.
77. See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1648 n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
78. See id. at 1648 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
79. See id. at 1645 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens explained that private
networks are subject to regulation under the Federal Election Campaign Act. See Forbes,
118 S.Ct. at 1645 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (1994)); infra note 267
(comparing the new standard for public television stations under Forbes to the federal
regulations governing private stations).
80. See Forbes, 118 S.Ct. at 1649-50 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also infra notes 27378 and accompanying text (explaining that AETC is a state agency).
81. Forbes, 118 S.Ct. at 1648 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
82. See id. at 1647-48 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 1648 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394
U.S. 147,150-51 (1969)).
84. Id. at 1649 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
85. For review of the public forum doctrine's framework and history, see JOHN E.
NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.45-47, at 1138-67 (5th ed.
1995); Robert C. Post, Between Governanceand Management: The History and Theory of
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Professor Harry Kalven wrote an influential article in which he first
coined the phrase "public forum." g In his analysis of the problems
raised by civil rights demonstrations on government-owned property,
Kalven drew from the theoretical framework established by the
Court in a series of cases 93 regarding the rights of citizens to
distribute leaflets in public places.94 He explained that the Court had
held that leaflet distribution could not be prohibited on public streets
and could only be regulated for "weighty reasons." 95 Kalven believed
that this framework provided a model that should be applied to all
cases in which citizens seek to exercise their freedom of speech in
public places. 96 While government should not have the power to
control the content of speech, Kalven contended that the government
should be permitted to implement "reasonable parliamentary rules"
demonstration at the Baton Rouge courthouse. See id. at 539-40. Nearly 2000 students
gathered at the courthouse to protest segregated lunch counters and the arrest of several
students who protested local lunch counters the day before. See id. at 538-39. As in
Edwards, the student protest was orderly. See id. at 540-44. Significantly, nearly 20 years
later the Court held that the sidewalks surrounding the U.S. Supreme Court building
constituted a public forum and deserved appropriate First Amendment protection. See
United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171,180 (1983).
92. Kalven, supra note 86, at 12. Kalven wrote that "the streets, the parks, and other
public places are an important facility for public discussion and political process. They are
in brief a public forum that the citizen can commandeer; the generosity and empathy with
which such facilities are made available is an index of freedom." Kalven, supra note 86, at
11-12 (emphasis added). Although Kalven's article has received acclaim, see, e.g., Post,
supra note 85, at 1718, 1724 (describing Kalven's article as "classic" and "profoundly
influential"), he claimed to do "no more than to invoke a slightly different way of looking
at familiar issues," Kalven, supranote 86, at 10.
93. See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) (overturning conviction of defendants
who had distributed leaflets without printing the name and address of the leaflet's author,
printer, and sponsor); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943) (rejecting an ordinance that
prohibited the distribution of leaflets); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942)
(upholding an ordinance forbidding the distribution of commercial handbills); Schneider v.
New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (holding that public interest in cleanliness did not justify
prohibition against all distribution of handbills in public places).
At least one
commentator has suggested that Kalven may have mischaracterized the nature of the
Court's holdings in the leaflet cases. See Post, supra note 85, at 1720. While Kalven used
the leaflet cases to explain a framework developed by the Court for leaflet distribution on
public property, Post notes that at the same time the Court also rejected an ordinance
banning door-to-door leaflet distribution in private places. See Post, supranote 85, at 1720
(citing Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943)). Post suggests that the Court was
protecting speech generally, not just speech in public places. See Post, supra note 85, at
1720.
94. See Kalven, supra note 86, at 15-21.
95. Id. at 21.
96. See id.; see also C. Thomas Dienes, The Trashingof the Ptiblic Forum: Problems
in FirstAmendment Analysis, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 109, 112 (1986) (explaining that
"Kalven's public-forum concept had suggested that the First Amendment right of access
was not limited to streets and parks").
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to govern public dialogue on public property.97 He argued that
government should be permitted to place reasonable time, place, and
manner restrictions on expression in public places. 8 In evaluating
those restrictions, Kalven urged the Court to use a balancing test
weighing the public interest in free expression against the other
functions of public places with "the thumb of the Court ...on the

speech side of the scales." 99 In the end, Kalven cautioned that
designing rules to govern the public forum framework "poses a
problem of formidable practical difficulty."100
Shortly after Professor Kalven's article was published, Adderley
v. Florida' came before the Court. In Adderley, a group of AfricanAmerican students was arrested after protesting at a jail and refusing
to leave following a request from the sheriff to do so.102 They were
subsequently convicted under a Florida trespass statute.1 3 The case
presented the Court with its first opportunity to implement Kalven's
framework, but Justice Black's majority opinion steered clear of such
an approach. The Court upheld the convictions because the students
did not present any evidence that the sheriff had objected to the
content of their protest. °4 In addition, the Court justified its holding
by noting that similar protests or gatherings had not occurred at the
jail during its history.0 5 Hearkening back to the philosophy
97. Kalven, supra note 86, at 23. Kalven drew a parallel between the need for some
reasonable regulation of public protests with the need for regulation at a traditional town
hall meeting so that everyone can speak and everyone can be heard. See id. at 23-25

(citing ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 24-28 (1960)).
98. See id. at 28.
99. Id. at 27-28.
100. Id. at 12. At least one commentator has claimed that Kalven did not intend for his
concept of the public forum to be used as "a tool for categorizing different kinds of
government property." Post, supra note 85, at 1718. While the premise of Kalven's article
gives rise to such a conclusion, the words and metaphors he used provide some support for
the Court's later development of a public forum doctrine focused on the character of
government property. For example, Kalven wrote that "[w]hen the citizen goes to the
street, he is exercising an immemorial right of a free man, a kind of First-Amendment
easement." Kalven, supra note 86, at 13 (emphasis added).
101. 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
102. See id. at 40.
103. See id. at 40-41.
104. See id. at 47.
105. See id. Justice Black distinguished the student protest in Adderley from the
protest in Edwards by explaining that jails, unlike state capitol grounds, were not
traditionally built to be open for the public. See id. at 41. The Court's discussion of
content and history may be oblique nods to Kalven's commentary. Compare id. at 41, 47
(discussing the traditional use of the property at issue and noting that the sheriff did not
"object[] to what was being sung or said by the demonstrators"), with Kalven, supra note
86, at 23-27 (discussing the traditional use of property for speech and state "control of
content").
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articulated by the Court in the late nineteenth century, Justice Black
wrote that the government, just like any property owner, "has power
to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is
lawfully dedicated."'' 6 While the Court avoided adopting Kalven's
approach, this statement provided a foothold for what the Court later
described as the "nonpublic forum.""
Six years later, the Court handed down two decisions that
embraced Professor Kalven's theoretical framework for examining
public speech rights in public places. 0 8 In Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 0 9 protesters were convicted for violating an ordinance
forbidding noise-making near school buildings while school was in
session" O by demonstrating against discrimination in a local high
school."' Writing for the majority, Justice Marshall explained that
government may regulate speech and assembly on public property."2
He noted that in regulating such speech, "[tlhe crucial question is
whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the
normal activity of a particular place at a particular time."1 3 To that
end, Justice Marshall noted that the regulation needs to be narrowly

tailored to meet the government's interest in the place and time." 4
Proceeding to uphold the constitutionality of the ordinance, the
Grayned Court echoed Professor Kalven's analysis in several
respects." 5 First, the Court explained that citizens' right to use public
property for free expression "may be restricted only for weighty
reasons." 1 6 In addition, the Court noted that "reasonable 'time,
106. Adderley, 385 U.S. at 47. Even after Adderley, the Court continued to wrestle
with the problems raised by the protests of the Civil Rights movement. See, e.g.,
Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1968) (considering whether conviction under
a Birmingham city ordinance prohibiting public demonstrations without a permit was
constitutionally valid).
107. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983); see
also Dienes, supra note 96, at 116 (describing Adderley as the "foundation for the
nonpublic-forum doctrine").
108. For a discussion of Kalven's influence on these decisions, see Post, supra note 85,
at 1729-33.
109. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
110. See id. at 107-08.
111. See id. at 105-06.
112. See id. at 115.
113. Id. at 116.
114. See id. at 116-17.
115. See id. at 116 n.34.
116. Id at 115. Compare id. (noting "[t]he right to use a public place for expressive
activity may be restricted only for weighty reasons"), with Kalven, supra note 86, at 21
(explaining that "the right to the streets as a public forum is such that leaflet distribution
...can be regulated only for weighty reasons" and "the leaflet cases furnish the relevant
model for analysis of the complex speech issues involved" in mass civil rights protests).
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place, and manner' regulations may be necessary to further
significant governmental interests, and are permitted.' 1 7 Finally, the
Court asserted that in conducting the balancing test between free
speech and the government's interest in a particular place, courts
"must weigh heavily the fact that communication is involved." 8
Police Department v. Mosley" 9 was decided on the same day as
Grayned. Mosley struck down an ordinance that prohibited picketing
near schools in session.120 The ordinance, however, provided an2
exception allowing protests for school-related labor disputes.1 1
Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court relied explicitly on Professor
2
Kalven's work, referring to public facilities as a "public forum.'1
The Court explained that in a public forum, the government "may
13
not select which issues are worth discussing or debating.""
Furthermore, the Court stressed that because First Amendment
rights are at stake, government regulation of expression in a public
forum is subject to strict scrutiny.1 24 As a result, the Court held that
the ordinance was unconstitutional because its restriction was based
solely on the content of the protest." s

Two years later the Court again addressed the emerging public
forum doctrine in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights,126 the first case
involving a political candidate to use the notion of the public
forum. 27 The candidate in Lehman asked the city to place campaign

117. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 115 (quoting Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575-76
(1941)); cf Kalven, supra note 86, at 27 (explaining that "regulation of time, place,
manner, and circumstance" is appropriate in examining cases concerning mass protest).
118. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 116; cf.Kalven, supra note 86, at 27-28 (explaining that the
Court's regulation of mass protest must "weigh heavily the fact that communication was
involved").
119. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
120. See id. at 92-94; cf. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980) (rejecting on equal
protection grounds a statute banning picketing of residences except peaceful picketing of a
location that is involved in a labor dispute).
121. See Mosley, 408 U.S. at 92-93.
122- Id. at 96, 99. This description represents the first time that the Court labeled
public property as a public forum. See Post, supra note 85, at 1731. Justice Marshall's
opinion explicitly cited Kalven's work. See Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95 n.3, 99 n.6.
123. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96.
124. See id. at 98-99.
125. See id. at 102. The Court explained that the statute in question was not content
neutral by emphasizing that "[t]he operative distinction is the message on a picket sign."
Id
126. 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (plurality opinion).
127. See id. (plurality opinion). Justice Blackmun wrote the plurality opinion, which
was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and Rehnquist. See id. at 299
(plurality opinion). Justice Douglas wrote a concurring opinion. See id. at 305 (Douglas,
J., concurring) (emphasizing the "right of commuters to be free from forced intrusions" as
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advertisements on spaces reserved for advertisements on the city's
transit system. 128
Although commercial advertisements were
129
permitted on the spaces, the city denied the candidate's request.
The Court upheld the city's denial, but no five justices agreed on a
rationale.13 The Court's plurality opinion concluded that the spaces
reserved for advertisements were not public fora.' 31 The plurality
justified this conclusion by examining the "nature of the forum" and
identifying the city's interest in the spaces as "proprietary."' 3
In dissent, Justice Brennan sought to develop clear criteria to
evaluate whether a public forum existed. 3 3 Citing Professor Kalven's
article, he wrote that in assessing whether government property
should be classified as a public forum, "the Court [should] strike a
balance between the competing interests of the government, on the
one hand, and the speaker and his audience, on the other.' ' 34 Justice
Brennan believed that in Lehman the government had "voluntarily
established" a public forum by installing space for advertisements
and posting commercial and public service advertisements. 35 He
contended that by accepting some advertisements, the government
had "effectively waived any argument" that advertising on the transit
system was incompatible with the system's primary function. 36 In
conclusion, he argued that government cannot selectively exclude
expression from such a forum merely because of its content. 37
Although the Lehman Court did not clarify the formula for
evaluating public speech rights in public places, its opinions began to
bring the modem public forum classifications into focus. 3 In 1976,

a captive audience on city buses). Justice Brennan wrote a dissenting opinion, which
Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Powell joined. See id. at 308 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
128. See id. at 299-300 (plurality opinion).
129. See id. at 300-01 (plurality opinion).
130. See id. at 299 (plurality opinion).
131. See id. at 301-02 (plurality opinion).
132. Id. at 302-04 (plurality opinion).
133. See id. at 312 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
134. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 314 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
136. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
137. See id. at 316 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
138. The Court's holding in Lehman established that certain public property does not
constitute a public forum. See id at 302-04 (plurality opinion). In dissent, Justice
Brennan implicitly agreed that not all public property is a public forum, but he also
recognized that the government could voluntarily establish a public forum where one had
not previously existed. See id. at 310, 312 (Brennan, J., dissenting). While the Court had
previously held that certain government property is not a public forum, see, e.g., Adderley
v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (upholding conviction for protesting on prison grounds),
Justice Brennan's dissent represents the first time that a member of the Court
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two years after Lehman, the Court again confronted a public forum
issue involving political candidates in Greer v. Spock."9 In Greer,
several independent political candidates sought to enter a base to
meet with military personnel to discuss campaign issues and
distribute campaign literature. 4 0

The base's commanding officer

denied their request in accordance with regulations prohibiting
political speeches on the base.' 4' The Court upheld the regulations
and ruled that the candidates did not have a constitutional right to
speak at the base because a military base is not a public forum. 42
Relying on Adderley, the Court stated that a public forum is not
created whenever people are given access to government-owned
property. 43 Rather, it emphasized that the property at issue
144
traditionally had not served as a place for free expression.
Furthermore, the Court reiterated that the government had the

authority to preserve public property for its intended use. 4 5 In this
case, the property's intended use was a military training facility. 146 As
acknowledged that the government could create a public forum, see Lehman, 418 U.S. at
310 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (writing that "the city created a forum for the... expression
of ideas"). See also Post, supra note 85, at 1736 (explaining that "Brennan's dissent was
the first effort to set forth a systematic doctrine of the public forum"). By 1976, in
Madison Joint School DistrictNo. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 429
U.S. 167 (1976), the Court recognized that government could "open] a forum for direct
citizen involvement," in which case it cannot discriminate against speakers based on "the
content of their speech." Id. at 175-76 (holding that an order by the Wisconsin
Employment Relations Commission prohibiting teachers, other than the designated
collective bargaining representatives, from speaking about labor issues at open meetings
of local school boards violated the teachers' First Amendment rights). The first case that
explicitly acknowledged the limited public forum was Heffron v. InternationalSociety for
Krishna Consciousness,Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981), which held that the Minnesota State Fair
was a limited public forum. See id. at 655.
Less than a year after Lehman, the Court ruled that a city-leased auditorium and a
city-owned auditorium were public fora. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad,
420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975). Moreover, the Court held that the auditoriums' directors had
violated a promoter's First Amendment rights when they denied his application to bring
the musical Hair to the auditorium. See id. at 561-62. The holding was based on the
doctrine of prior restraint, which required procedural safeguards. See id. at 562.
139. 424 U.S. 828 (1976). The decision in Greer has been called "pivotal" in the
development of the public forum doctrine. Post, supra note 85, at 1739. The holding in
Greer has also been criticized as beginning an "unfortunate pattern" in which the Court
has made "no effort to articulate any connection between its definition of a public forum
and a theory of the first amendment." Id at 1741.
140. See Greer, 424 U.S. at 832-33.
141. See id. at 833 n.3.
142. See id. at 838-40.
143. See id. at 837.
144. See id. at 838.
145. See id.
146. See id. at 837-38.
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such, the government could restrict speech on the base without

violating the potential speaker's constitutional rights, as long as the
restriction was not applied "irrationally, invidiously, or arbitrarily." 147
The rationale in Greer represented a shift in analyzing public
forum cases.1 48 The Court had moved from considering "whether the
manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal
activity of a particular place at a particular time"'49 to considering the
traditional use of the place and the government's proprietary control
over it. 5 In developing the public forum doctrine, the Court fully
embraced Professor Kalven's description of the public forum in terms
of the property at issue, while ignoring the fundamental message of
his theoretical framework advocating "parliamentary rules" with the
Court's "thumb ... on the speech side."''
Dissenting in Greer, Justice Brennan cautioned that the
majority's shift in forum analysis blinded the Court to the importance
of accommodating free expression.Y2 He called for the Court to use a
more flexible approach when assessing free speech rights on
government property. 53 Justice Brennan ominously warned the
Court that "with the rigid characterization of a given locale as not a
public forum, there is the danger that certain forms of public speech
at the locale may be suppressed, even though they are basically
compatible with the activities otherwise occurring at the locale."' 54
The danger that Justice Brennan had warned about in Greer was
realized in Widmar v. Vincent. 5 5 In Widmar, the University of
147. Id. at 840. In fact, the Court noted that "[w]hat the record shows ... is a
considered ... policy, objectively and evenhandedly applied, of keeping official military
activities [on the base] wholly free of entanglement with partisan political campaigns of
any kind." Id. at 839.
148. See Post, supra note 85, at 1745. Post has explained that Greer's legacy is a sharp
distinction between public and nonpublic fora. See id. He has contended that Greer
provides government with "virtual immunity" in limiting free expression in a nonpublic
forum based on its control over the location. Id.
149. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,116 (1972).
150. See Post, supra note 85, at 1742-43.
151. Kalven, supranote 86, at 24, 28.
152- See Greer, 424 U.S. at 859 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
153. See id. at 859-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
154. Id at 860 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan's admonition is particularly
noteworthy because he wrote the influential dissenting opinion in Lehman, which called
for a clearer development of the public forum doctrine. See Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 308 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Post, supra note 85, at 1744; see also
supra notes 133-37 and accompanying text (discussing Brennan's dissent in Lehman).
Remarkably, Justice Marshall, who wrote the Court's opinions in Grayned and Mosley
that first gave voice to the Court's adherence to Kalven's notion of the public forum, also
joined the dissent. See supranotes 109-25 and accompanying text.
155. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
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Missouri at Kansas City allowed registered student groups to use its
facilities for a myriad of purposes, but it prohibited one such group
156
from meeting in its facilities for religious worship and discussion.
The Court held that the university's policy generally permitting
groups to use its facilities created a public forum. 15 7 While the
university did not have to create a forum in the first place,158 the
Court held that once such a forum had been created, the university
could only regulate access based on the content of the speech if the
"regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and ... it
is narrowly drawn to achieve that end." 159 In its opinion, the Court
hinted that the forum at issue was different from traditional public
fora previously recognized by the Court, such as
streets and parks,
160
because it had been created by university policy.
Explicit recognition of different types of public fora became
clear two years later, when the Court decided Perry Education Ass'n
v. PerryLocal Educators'Ass'n.161 The Court's five-to-four decision
in Perry proved to be the defining moment of the modern public
forum doctrine.162 The collective bargaining agreement of the Perry
school district gave the Perry Education Association ("PEA"), which
was the exclusive bargaining representative of teachers in the district,
access to the interschool mail system and teachers' mailboxes.1 63 The
district denied other teachers' unions the same access. 64 The issue in
Perry centered on the efforts of the Perry Local Educators'
Association ("PLEA") to gain access to the mail system.1 65 While the

156. See id. at 265.
157. See id. at 267.
158. See id. at 268.

159. Id. at 270. The Court ruled that the state's interest was not "sufficiently
'compelling' to justify content-based discrimination" against a student group seeking to
use university facilities for religious purposes. Id. at 277-78. The Court also wrestled with
the issue of separation of church and state under the Establishment Clause, ultimately
holding that an "equal access policy" would not be incompatible with the Constitution's
mandates. See id. at 271-77.
160. See id. at 268 n.5; see also Post, supra note 85, at 1748-49 (discussing the
implications of Widmar).
161. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
162- See Steven G. Gey, Reopening the Public Forum-FromSidewalks to Cyberspace,

58 OHIo ST. L.J. 1535, 1547-50 (1998); see also Day, supra note 87, at 147 (noting that the
modem forum doctrine was enunciated first in Perry).
163. See Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 38-39. The Court noted that the "primary
function" of the mailboxes was to "transmit official messages among the teachers and
between the teachers and the school administration." Id. at 39.
164. See id. The exclusive use policy only applied to the mailboxes-not to other
school facilities. See id. at 41.
165. See id.
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Court determined that the mail system was a nonpublic forum,166 the
significance of the decision lay not in its holding but in its rationale.
For the first time, the Court stated that when evaluating the
public's right to speech on public property, the property should be
classified into one of three categories: (1) traditional public forum;
(2) designated public forum; (3) or nonpublic forum.'67 The Court
1 68
stipulated that each category carried with it different rights.
Drawing on Justice Roberts's opinion in Hague, the Court explained
that the first category consisted of "quintessential" public fora, such
as streets and parks. 6 9 These fora were places that "by long tradition
or by government fiat" have been open to citizens for public debate
and free expression. 7° The Court held that the government could
only exclude speakers from such fora based on content if "its
regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and ... it
In addition, the
is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.''
government could regulate the "time, place, and manner of
expression" in these quintessential public fora as long as the
regulations are "content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a
significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative
channels of communication."' 172
Guided by Widmar, the Court described the second forum
classification as "public property which the State has opened for use
by the public as a place for expressive activity.' 1 73 As in Widmar, the
Court recognized that governments are not required to open such a
forum to the public. 74 Furthermore, the Court stressed that once
governments opened such a forum, they are not required to maintain
the forum indefinitely.'75 As long as the forum remains open,
however, government regulation must follow the same standards that

166. See id. at 53. In light of the Court's holding in Forbes, it is significant that Perry
emphasized that "[d]uring election periods, PLEA is assured of equal access to all modes
of communication." Id. (emphasis added).
167. See id at 45-46.
168. See id. The public forum framework established in Perry was bolstered in
significance by the Court's implication that "the nature of the forum must be considered
before other factors, especially the nature of the government's regulatory action." Day,
supranote 87, at 162.
169. PerryEduc. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45.
170. Id.
171. Id. (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980)); see also Day, supra note 87,
at 150 (describing the traditional public forum as a "highly speech-protective device").
172. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45.
173. Id.
174. See id.
175. See id. at 46.
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apply to traditional public fora. 76 Arguably, the most significant
feature of the second forum category was the Court's recognition that
"[a] public forum may be created for a limited purpose 'such
as use by
177
certain groups or for the discussion of certain subjects.
Finally, the Perry Court held that all other government property
is subject to a different standard than for traditional and limited
public fora. 171 The Court noted that the" 'First Amendment does not

guarantee access to property simply because it is owned or controlled
by the government.' "179 Relying once again on Justice Black's
comparison of the government to a "private owner" in Adderley,18°
the Court ruled that the government may regulate speech in a
nonpublic forum to protect the forum's intended uses.181 The Court
only limited the government's ability to regulate a nonpublic forum
by stipulating that the regulation must be reasonable and "not an
effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose
the speaker's views. ' ' s'

In Perry, the Court's analysis in classifying the school district's
mail system as a nonpublic forum provided a subtle subtext for the
framework it had articulated earlier in the opinion.18 3 The Court
176. See id. Post has argued that this holding is a questionable assertion contradicted
by the precedents used by the Court to support it. See Post, supra note 85, at 1753. Such
precedents include Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), and Madison Joint School
DistrictNo. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 429 U.S. 167 (1976). See
Post, supranote 85, at 1753.
177. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7 (citation omitted). Remarkably, the Court
made this point in a footnote to its opinion. See id. Post has characterized this footnote as
"puzzling." Post, supra note 85, at 1753. He has contended that "the footnote eviscerates
the rule that in regulating public access to the limited public forum the government is
bound by the same first amendment standards as bind the government's ability to regulate
access to the traditional public forum." Id.
178. See Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46. The labels given to the first two categories
(traditional and designated public fora) were drawn from the Court's explanation of the
final category, which the Court aptly described as "[p]ublic property which is not by
traditionor designation a forum for public communication." Id. (emphasis added).
179. Id. (quoting United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453
U.S. 114,129 (1981)).
180. See Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47-48 (1966); supra notes 101-07 and
accompanying text (discussing Adderley).
181. See PerryEduc. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46.
182. Id.The Court later labeled this test as the "viewpoint neutral" standard. Lamb's
Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393 (1993); Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985); see also Healy v.
James, 408 U.S. 169, 187 (1972) ("The mere disagreement ... with the group's philosophy
affords no reason to deny its recognition.... As repugnant as these views may have been,
...the mere expression of [the group's views] would not justify the denial of First
Amendment rights.").
183. See Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 47-53.
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reasoned that if the school district had opened up the mail system to
the general public, then PLEA would have had a legitimate claim
that the district had created a public forum.'"' But, the Court noted,
people outside the school system who wished to use the mail system
had to receive permission from the district. 5 The Court held that
"[t]his type of selective access does not transform government
property into a public forum."'86 In dicta, the Court explained that
even if the mail system was a limited public forum due to the school
district's grant of access to groups such as the Cub Scouts and
YMCA, the right to access the forum would "extend only to other
entities of similar character."'" In keeping with the framework it had
established, the Court upheld the exclusion of PLEA from the mail
system and noted that the exclusion from the nonpublic 8forum was
8
justified based on the different status of PLEA and PEA.
Thus, the Court in Perry waded fully into the "problem of
formidable practical difficulty" of which Professor Kalven had
warned when he first wrote about the public forum nearly twenty
years earlier. 8 9 By focusing on the nature of the property in
question, the Court seemed to adopt Kalven's approach to public
speech in public places. 90 Kalven's initial public forum theory,
however, had not contemplated circumstances such as Perry. He had
only been concerned with "mass protest in public places" such as
streets, state capitols, and courthouses, not union access to public
school district's internal mail systems. 19'
In Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund,
Inc.,19 the Court continued to refine the practicalities of the
emerging public forum doctrine. 93 In Cornelius,the Court ruled that
the Combined Federal Campaign ("CFC"), 9 4 a charity drive, was a
184. See id. at 47.
185. See id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 48. The Court stated that organizations like the Cub Scouts and YMCA
were "engage[d in activities of interest and educational relevance to students," but PLEA
was only "concerned with the terms and conditions of teacher employment." Id. Because
PLEA was not one of the groups for which the government intended to open the forum
nor was it discussing a subject intended to be protected, PLEA could have been excluded
even if the mail system was a designated public forum. See id
188. See id. at 49.
189. Kalven, supra note 86, at 12.
190. See Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 49.
191. Kalven, supra note 86, at 11.
192. 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
193. For further discussion of the Court's holding in Cornelius, see Post, supra note 85,
at 1756-57 and Day, supra note 87, at 164-67.
194. The CFC is a charity drive focused on raising money from federal employees. See
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nonpublic forum and consequently held that the government could
prohibit solicitation of federal employees in government workplaces
by legal defense and political advocacy organizations. 195 Before
determining what First Amendment rights were at stake in the case,
the Court confronted the issue of determining the relevant forum to
be analyzed-the workplace or the CFC. 196 The Court explained that

"forum analysis is not completed merely by identifying the
government property at issue."'' Instead, the Cornelius Court stated
that the "access sought by the speaker" should be the starting point
for its analysis. 98 If the speaker seeks "general access" to
government property, then that whole property represents the
relevant forum.199 When the speaker seeks "limited access" to public

places, the Court will take "a more tailored approach to ascertaining
the perimeters of a forum within the confines of the government
property." ' The Court noted that the organizations sought limited
access to a particular means of communication, and therefore the
CFC was the relevant forum in this case. 01 The Court's opinion also
emphasized that the government's intent was critical in establishing
whether a limited public forum existed.es
Once the Court
established that the CFC was a nonpublic forum, it upheld the
restrictions on participation because "[t]he Government's decision to
restrict access to a nonpublic forum need only be reasonable;it need
Cornelius,473 U.S. at 790. An executive order by President Reagan limited participation
in the CFC to tax-exempt, non-profit charitable agencies that provide health and welfare
services. See id. at 795. President Reagan's executive order excluded legal defense and
political advocacy organizations from the CFC. See id.
195. See id. at 804-06.
196. See id. at 801.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See id.
200. Id.
201. See id. The government argued that the relevant forum was the workplace. See
id. at 800. Presumably, the government staked out this position because the federal
workplace, like the mail system in Perry, was a proprietary, nonpublic forum in which the
government would have broad discretion to exclude certain speakers.
202 See id. at 802; see also Day, supra note 87, at 167 (explaining that Cornelius was
the first case in which the government intent standard was used). As the Court noted,
"[t]he government does not create a public forum by inaction or by permitting limited
discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse."
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802. The Court's opinion also included several thoughts in dicta
that are noteworthy in light of the Forbes holding. See id. at 809-11 ("[A]voiding the
appearance of political favoritism is a valid justification for limiting speech in a nonpublic
forum.... The existence of reasonable grounds for limiting access to a nonpublic forum,
however, will not save a regulation that is in reality a facade for viewpoint-based
discrimination.").
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not be the most reasonable or the only reasonable limitation."2 3
Since Perry and Cornelius, the Court has continued to give
meaning to the public forum doctrine and apply it in a variety of
circumstances. 4 Some justices and commentators, however, have
203. Cornelius,473 U.S. at 808.
204. For example, the Court has extended the doctrine to things that constitute fora
"more in a metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic sense." Rosenberger v. Rector &
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995) (holding that the University of Virginia's
Student Activity Fund was a limited public forum); see also Minnesota State Bd. for
Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 280 (1984) (holding that college
administrators' "meet and confer" sessions with teachers concerning policy questions did
not constitute a traditional or designated public forum).
The Court also has continued to classify actual property and has ruled that
government property is not a public forum merely because it can be used as a means of
expression. See Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 814
(1984) (holding that utility poles are nonpublic fora); see also United States Postal Serv. v.
Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981) (stating that "the First
Amendment does not guarantee access to property simply because it is owned or
controlled by the government").
The Court's holdings in these cases have sent a series of confusing signals about the
contours of the public forum doctrine. For example, the Court has stated that residential
streets are traditional public fora despite the fact that they are narrow and the surrounding
residents are concerned that protesters might impede the flow of traffic. See Frisby v.
Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 477, 480-81 (1988) (noting that residential streets are public fora
while upholding a statute banning "picketing before or about the residence or dwelling of
any individual" because the statute was narrowly tailored and fulfilled a "significant
government interest"); see also Day, supra note 87, at 173-75 (discussing the Frisby
decision). But see Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980) (rejecting on equal protection
grounds a statute banning picketing of residences except peaceful picketing of a location
that is involved in a labor dispute).
By contrast, the Court has held that airport terminals are not public fora in part
because the "normal flow of traffic [could be] impeded." International Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 683-84 (1992); see also Gey, supra note 162, at
1555-58 (analyzing the holding and decisions in Lee); Day, supra note 87, at 192-98
(exploring the significance of Lee). In Lee, the Court also based its holding that airport
terminals are not public fora on "the lateness with which the modern air terminal has
made its appearance" and the potential for "inconveniences to passengers." Lee, 505 U.S.
at 680, 685. The decision in Lee followed Board of Airport Commissioners v. Jews for
Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569 (1987), in which the Court found it unnecessary to address how an
airport terminal should be classified under the forum doctrine. See id. at 573-74 (rejecting
as overbroad an airport regulation stipulating that the terminal is "'not open for First
Amendment activities'" (quoting the airport regulation)); see also Day, supra note 87, at
168-70 (discussing the holding and implication of Jews for Jesus). In addition, a plurality
of the Court in United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990) (plurality opinion), held that
a sidewalk outside a post office is not a public forum because it was "constructed solely to
assist postal patrons to negotiate the space between the parking lot and the front door."
Id. at 720, 728 (plurality opinion); see also Day, supra note 87, at 179-85 (analyzing the
Kokinda decision and suggesting that it represents "a new standard for determining a
traditional forum"). But see Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist.,
508 U.S. 384, 391 (1993) (describing "traditional public forums such as parks and
sidewalks"); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983) (holding that the sidewalks
outside the U.S. Supreme Court are public fora).
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denounced the entire approach as an ineffective method of assessing
citizens' rights to free expression. °5 The doctrine has been criticized
for being "virtually impermeable to common sense, ' 26 developing
20 8
artificial distinctions, 2°7 and amounting to "doctrinal pigeonholing.
Much of this criticism centers on the doctrine's overemphasis on the
property interest of the
government rather than the free speech
29
interests of the people.
In modem forum doctrine cases, the Court tends to focus first on
the "character of the property at issue. 210 This focus provides a
"geographical approach to first amendment law, [under which]
results often hinge almost entirely on the speaker's location."21 1
Rather than consider the First Amendment issues at stake, the
modem forum doctrine tends to concentrate on property
classification.
This tendency leads courts to evaluate the
government's interest in the property as if the property itself were
private and the government, as owner, had the right to exclude
people from it at will.213 While geographic labeling may be an
efficient way to decide cases,214 the nature of public property is lost in
modem forum analysis.215 More importantly, reliance on forum
analysis "distracts attention" from the First Amendment interests

205. See, e.g., Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 744 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Cornelius,473 U.S. at
822 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Day, supra note 87, at 168; Daniel A. Farber & John E.
Nowak, The MisleadingNature of Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First
Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REv. 1219, 1224 (1984); Post, supra note 85, at 1715,
1767; Frederick Schauer, Principles,Institutions, and the FirstAmendment, 112 HARV. L.

REV. 84, 97-100 (1998).
206. Post, supra note 85, at 1715.

207. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 46, 93
(1987).
208. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 743 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
209. In his dissent in Cornelius,Justice Blackmun captured the essence of this criticism
when he wrote that "[r]ather than taking the nature of the property into account in
balancing the First Amendment interests of the speaker and society's interests in freedom
of speech against the interests served by reserving the property to its normal use, the
Court simply labels the property and dispenses with the balancing." Cornelius,473 U.S. at
821 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
210. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983).
211. Farber & Nowak, supranote 205, at 1220.
212. See Post, supra note 85, at 1766; see, e.g., International Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 677-83 (1992).
213. See Dienes, supra note 96, at 112; see also Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 390 (1993) (concluding that "[t]here is no question
that the District, like the private owner of property, may legally preserve the property
under its control for the use which it is dedicated").
214. See Dienes, supra note 96, at 120.
215. See Post, supranote 85, at 1798.
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being sacrificed.216 Although courts rely on Professor Kalven's
original framing of the public forum as a question of property,217 the
modem forum doctrine no longer reflects his ultimate call for a
balancing of the public's free speech interests against the normal uses
of the property at issue.218 Instead of keeping its "thumb ...on the
speech side of the scales, 2 19 the modem Court has tended to place its
"thumb" firmly on the government's side.P0
In Forbes, the outcome of the case ultimately hinged on how the
debate was classified within the public forum framework?2' While

the Eighth Circuit's classification of the debate as a limited public
forum paved the way for Forbes's inclusion, m the Supreme Court's
classification of it as a nonpublic forum gave public television stations
free reign to exclude non-major-party candidates.'z For Forbes, like
all speakers who seek to protect their interest in freely expressing
themselves in public places, the case ultimately turned on how the
Court categorized the property where Forbes sought to speak, rather
than the speech interests he sought to exercise2 24

Although commentators bristle at the Court's use of property
classification as a means for determining First Amendment rights,M
the Court's system of classification is even more troubling because of
the limited scope of the traditional public forum and the Court's
reluctance to use the limited public forum label. In defining the
216. Farber & Nowak, supra note 205, at 1224.
217. See Kalven, supra note 86, at 13; see also supra note 100 (discussing Kalven's use
of property images).
218. See Kalven, supra note 86, at 27.
219. Id. at 28.
220. See Day, supra note 87, at 163 (noting that the modem forum doctrine is speechrestrictive rather than speech-protective).
221. See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1641.
222. See Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 93 F.3d 497, 500 (8th Cir.
1996), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 633 (1998).
223. See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1645 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); see, e.g., International Soc'y
for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 683 (1992); Members of the City
Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 814-15 (1984); Minnesota State Bd. for
Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 280-83 (1984). This outcome counters
popular notions of the importance of debate in campaigns. As Reed Hundt, former
chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, has explained, America must "find
ways to make it easier for candidates to get their messages across and to challenge other
candidates' messages, as opposed to hampering their ability to do so. The heart of a
democratic society is an electorate that is provided with sufficient information to make
informed choices." Reed E. Hundt, The Public'sAirwaves: What Does the Public Interest
Require of Television Broadcasters?,45 DUKE L.J. 1089, 1102 (1996).
224. See Forbes,118 S.Ct. at 1641-44.
225. See, e.g., Dienes, supra note 96, at 120; Farber & Nowak, supra note 205, at 1224;
Post, supranote 85, at 1766.
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traditional public forum, the Court examines the historical use of the
property at issue.' While this historical perspective generally has
protected the public's use of sidewalks, streets, and parks as fora for
free expression, 227 it has also been relied on as a justification for
excluding citizens from exercising their First Amendment rights at
other public facilities.
In essence, the historical-use standard
forecloses the possibility that any new public fora will be recognized
by the Court.z 9 The importance of sidewalks, streets, and parks to
American public discourse has diminished considerably as new
technologies emerge.210 Unfortunately, the Court has chosen to limit
its greatest First Amendment protection under the public forum
analysis to these arenas."'
226. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
227. See Day, supranote 87, at 176.
228. See, e.g., Lee, 505 U.S. at 680 (holding that an airport terminal is not a traditional
public forum in part because of "the lateness with which the modern air terminal has made
its appearance").
229. See Gey, supra note 162, at 1539. Concurring in Lee, Justice Kennedy, the author
of the Court's opinion in Forbes,warned that the public forum doctrine "leaves almost no
scope for the development of new public forums absent the rare approval of the
government." Lee, 505 U.S. at 695 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). How will
the Court classify a government website or handle other issues arising out of emerging
Internet technology? Certainly, such technology has not been around immemorially. For
a discussion of this question, see Gey, supra note 162, at 1611-33.
230. See Gey, supra note 162, at 1539. Because the relevant forum in Forbes was the
debate and not the television station, Forbes could have made a compelling argument that
the debate was a traditional public forum. See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1640. He could have
built this argument around the Court's recognition of the importance of candidate debates
throughout history. See id. Although debates are not open to the general public for
expressive purposes, Forbes might have argued that candidate debates are the streets and
sidewalks of campaigns. Furthermore, he could have explained that debates for "time out
of mind, have been used for ... communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing
public questions." Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). In light
of the Court's reluctance to acknowledge new traditional fora, see Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at
1641, this argument probably would not have succeeded, but Forbes made a tactical error
by conceding that the debate was not a traditional public forum. At a minimum, such an
argument would have provided additional support for Justice Stevens's contention that
debates hosted by public television stations "may not squarely fit within our public forum
analysis." Id. at 1648 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Forbes also may have had a credible claim under the "equal time" provisions of the
Federal Communications Act. See Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1994).
He could not pursue this claim in court because he had not exhausted his administrative
remedies with the FCC. See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1638. The "equal time" provision of
§ 315 stipulates that if a broadcaster allows a candidate to use its station, it "shall afford
equal opportunities" to other qualified candidates. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a). As in the Eighth
Circuit's first Forbes decision, courts have held that § 315 does not create a private cause
of action. See, e.g., Belluso v. Turner Communications Corp., 633 F.2d 393, 397 (5th Cir.
1980); Lamb v. Griffin Television, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 1430, 1432 (W.D. Okla. 1992); Maher
v. Sun Publications, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 353, 356 (D. Kan. 1978).
231. See PerryEduc. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 44.
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While the scope of the traditional public forum has remained
static, the Court rarely has classified government property as a
limited public forum. 2 When the Court does use the limited public
forum classification, it permits the government to exclude speakers
who wish to speak in a manner inconsistent with the government's
purpose for creating the forum.231 Justice Blackmun warned that
using government intent as a justification for keeping speakers out of
a limited forum "empties the limited-public-forum concept of al its
meaning."'
Because the Court's limited public forum analysis
begins by asking whether the government sought to open a forum to
a particular discussion or speaker, the mere fact that a speaker or
topic was excluded demonstrates that even if the government created
a limited forum, that speaker or topic was never intended to be
included in the forum.215 As a result, the government normally
should win in limited forum cases,236 particularly given the deference
the Court often shows the government in public forum cases.2 7 Such
deference allows government officials to have limitless control over

citizens' abilities to express themselves on public property.238
Essentially the Court has ceded control to government officials, who
are inclined to over-regulate speechY 9 Because speakers cannot
232. See Marc Rohr, Freedom of Speech After Justice Brennan,23 GOLDEN GATE U.
L. REV. 413,479 (1993); Rick A. Swanson, Comment, Regaining Lost Ground: Toward a
PublicForum Doctrine Underthe Illinois Constitution,18 S. ILL. U. L.J. 453, 460 (1994).
233. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 809
(1985).
234. Id at 815 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); see also Post, supra note 85, at 1754 (noting
that the modern forum doctrine "renders illusory the harsh first amendment constraints
formally made applicable to the limited public forum").
235. See Gey, supra note 162, at 1536; see also Cornelius,473 U.S. at 825 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (noting that "if the exclusion of some speakers is evidence that the
Government did not intend to create such a forum, no speaker challenging denial of access
will ever be able to prove that the forum is a limited public forum"). Justice Blackmun
also criticized the Court's reliance on the government intent standard as a method for
classifying property as a nonpublic forum. See Cornelius,473 U.S. at 825 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). Justice Blackmun explained that "[t]he very fact that the Government
denie[s] access to the speaker indicates that the Government did not intend to provide an
open forum for expressive activity, and under the Court's analysis that fact alone would
demonstrate that the forum is not a limited public forum." Id.; see also Day, supra note
87, at 168 (claiming that the government intent standard is "circular and vacuous").
Justice Blackmun's criticisms have been realized in many nonpublic forum cases as the
Court has accorded the government's intent "generous presumptions." See, e.g., United
States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 132-33 (1981);
Day, supra note 87, at 120.
236. See Gey, supranote 162, at 1549-50.
237. See Day, supra note 87, at 167.
238. See Post, supra note 85, at 1811.
239. See Day, supra note 87, at 187. Government officials "have an incentive to
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reasonably rely on either the traditional or limited public forum
classifications for protection in the vast majority of circumstances,
"the Court's modem forum analysis has now become, at best a 'nonforum doctrine' "that restricts free speech. 24°
The Court's nonpublic forum analysis rests on a reasonableness
standard that has proven to be a hollow limit on government
restrictions.24 ' In using this standard, the Court has never articulated
why classifying property as a nonpublic forum automatically frees the
government from the strict scrutiny the Court applies within other
fora.2 4 ' This problem is compounded because the Court merely
considers the government's purpose in excluding the speaker when it
reviews whether exclusions from a nonpublic forum represent
viewpoint discrimination. 243 This consideration ignores whether the
exclusion has any discriminatory effects. 24
Ultimately, the
framework that the Court has established for reviewing citizens' free
speech interests in a nonpublic forum saddles the citizen with the
burden of persuasion 245 and, consequently, is extraordinarily speech
restrictive.246
While the Court's nonpublic forum analysis may be problematic
in most circumstances, 247 it is particularly worrisome when applied to
candidate debates hosted by public television stations.248 In the
overregulate free speech" to "avoidnl disruption" of their normal activities or services. Id.
(citing David Goldberger, JudicialScrutiny in Public Forum Cases: Misplaced Trust in the
Judgment of Public Officials, 32 BUFF. L. REV. 175, 207-210 (1983)). Day argues that
"free speech doctrine cannot hinge on the 'intent' of the very officials it was designed to
constrain. Free speech interests-if they are to actually be free---cannot be hostage to the
government's intent." Id. at 203.
240. Id. at 201; see also Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 825 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (warning
that the majority's rationale in Cornelius "collapses the three categories of public forum,
limited public forum, and nonpublic forum into two"). The Court's classification of
property as a nonpublic forum normally represents the death knell for speakers' efforts to
gain access to the forum. See, e.g., International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v.
Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 684 (1992); Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466
U.S. 789,814 (1984); Minnesota State Bd.for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271,
280-83 (1984).
241. See Dienes, supra note 96, at 117 (explaining that the reasonableness standard is
"essentially no review at all").
242. See Cornelius,473 U.S. at 821 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
243. See Post, supra note 85, at 1824.
244. See id.
245. See Day, supra note 87, at 191.
246. See id. at 163.
247. See Cornelius,473 U.S. at 825 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Gey, supra note 162, at
149-50.
248. The disparity in lower courts' holdings concerning third-party candidates' right to
be included in debates hosted by public television stations and their different methods of
analyzing the similar issues not only illustrates the courts' opposing views about the proper

1999] CANDIDATE ACCESS TO TELEVISED DEBATES

1253

modem age, political candidates depend on mass media for electoral
success, 249 and the public relies heavily on television for information
about the candidates 5 0 As a result, congressional candidates spend
an inordinate amount of money attempting to get air time?5 1 Too
often, non-major-party candidates do not have the financial support
necessary to purchase such time, so they are compelled to rely on free
air time provided in such forums as candidate debates. 2 These
classification of the debates within the public forum doctrine but also underscores the
futility of using the modem doctrine to establish First Amendment rights. See Marcus v.
Iowa Pub. Television, 97 F3d 1137, 1139 (8th Cir. 1996), affd by 150 F3d 924 (8th Cir.
1998), petitionfor cert.filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3323 (U.S. Oct. 28, 1998) (No. 98-710) (upholding
public television station's exclusion of independent candidates from debates because the
station did not deem the candidates to be newsworthy); Chandler v. Georgia Pub.
Telecomm. Comm'n, 917 F.2d 486, 494 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (holding that public
television stations could exclude candidates from debates); DeYoung v. Patten, 898 F.2d
628,632 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that a legally qualified independent senatorial candidate
had no First Amendment right to air time greater than the right afforded by the Federal
Communications Act's equal time provision); Muir v. Alabama Educ. Television Comm'n,
688 E2d 1033, 1043 (Former 5th Cir. 1982) (plurality opinion) (en bane) (holding that
public television stations are not public fora); DeBauche v. Virginia Commonwealth Univ.,
7 F Supp. 2d 718,724 (E.D. Va. 1998) (holding that a candidate could be excluded from a
debate hosted by a private radio station and held at a public university); Arons v.
Donovan, 882 F. Supp. 379, 390 (D.N.J. 1995) (holding that a public television debate is a
limited public forum and a gubernatorial candidate could be excluded from such a debate
if the exclusion was not view-point based); Maher v. Sun Publications, Inc., 459 E Supp.
353, 356-57 (D. Kan. 1978) (noting that, even if the court had proper jurisdiction, it would
hold that the equal time doctrine does not require a private newspaper to include a
candidate from a debate it hosted even if the debate is televised); see generally Erick
Howard, Comment, DebatingPBS: Public Broadcastingand the Power to Exclude Political
Candidates from Televised Debates, U. CHI. LEGAL F, 435 (1995) (discussing the split
between the circuits who had considered the issue of excluding candidates from public
television debates).
249. See John B. Anderson, Editorial, Politics Just Got Tougher for Third Parties,
SACRAMENTO BEE, May 29, 1998, at B7, available in 1998 WL 8824618 ("In modern
politics, TV is the medium for the message."); Marquand, supra note 76, at I ("Which
candidates are taken seriously in American politics runs hand in hand with which ones get
air time or broadcast media.").
250. See Hundt, supra note 223, at 1102 (reporting that 80% of the public gets its
information about political campaigns "mostly from television") (citing Jeffrey A.
Levinson, Note, An Informed Electorate: Requiring Broadcasters to Provide Free Airtime
to Candidatesfor Public Office, 72 B.U. L. REV. 143, 146 n.10 (1992) (citing Survey:
Public PrefersTyson to Politics,L.A. TIMES, Mar. 5,1992, at A13)).
251. See id. at 1101 (citation omitted) (noting that the average congressional candidate
spends approximately $250,000 on media efforts).
252- See Man Challenges Ballot Access: Supporter of Green Party Asks State Court to
Look at Laws, CHARLESTON GAZET'r & DAILY MAIL (W. Va.), Sept. 28, 1996, at 8A,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Chrgaz File; Minor-Party Candidates Seek Media
Attention, IDAHO STATESMAN, Oct. 6, 1998, at 4B, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Idstmn File; David Wald, Independent PartiesMake Voices Heard at Election Hearing:
State Panel ConsidersMatchingFunds Ideas, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Feb. 19,1998,
at 16. For a discussion of how Minnesota's campaign finance laws helped the Reform
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debates generally play an important role in elections: 253 Not only do
they provide an opportunity for voters to learn more about the
candidates, 4 but they also give candidates a chance to influence the
outcome of elections. 5 Winning a campaign debate has a direct
impact on candidates' abilities to gain votes in elections.

6

Because

Party candidate, Jesse Ventura, win the election to become the state's new governor, see
Jon Jeter, CampaignReform Helped "The Body" Slam Rivals, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 1998,
at A41. For a discussion of the most famous candidate debates in American history, the
Lincoln-Douglas debates, see STEPHEN B. OATES, WITH MALICE TOWARD NONE: A
LIFE OFABRAHAM LINCOLN 149-60 (1994). For a series of thorough examinations of the
historical presidential debates between John F. Kennedy and Richard M. Nixon, see THE
GREAT DEBATES (Sidney Kraus ed., 1962). For an informative study of the series of
debates held between John Kerry and William Weld during their 1996 campaign for the
U.S. Senate in Massachusetts, see Douglas G. Rivlin, Debates and the Candidate
Agreement in the 1996 Senate Race in Massachusetts: A Report of the Annenberg Public
Policy Center of the University of Pennsylvania (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the North CarolinaLaw Review). The roadblocks to electoral success of third-party
and independent candidates in presidential elections is discussed in Paul R. Abramson et
al., Third-Partyand Independent Candidatesin American Politics: Wallace, Anderson, and
Perot, 110 POL. SCI. Q. 349 (1995). Meanwhile, the support received by winning thirdparty and independent candidates is analyzed in Howard L. Reiter & Julie M. Walsh, Who
Votes for Non-Major Party Candidates?: The Cases of Longley, Sanders, and Weicker, 27
POLITY 651 (1995).
253. For discussions on the role of debates in presidential elections, see generally
HELLWEG ET AL., TELEVISED PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES: ADVOCACY IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICA (1992); KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON & DAVID S. BIRDSELL,
SusAN A.

PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES: THE CHALLENGE OF CREATING AN INFORMED ELECTORATE

(1988); TASK FORCE ON DEBATES, supra note 67. For recent deliberations on how to
engender increased public debate between candidates, see Edward B. Foley, Public
Debate and Campaign Finance, 30 CONN. L. REV. 817 (1998); Jeremy Paul, Campaign
Reform for the 21st Century: PuttingMouth Where the Money Is, 30 CONN. L. REV. 779
(1998). For another example of non-major-party candidates attempting to be included in
candidate debates, see Perot v. Federal Election Comm'n, 97 F.3d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
254. See JAMIESON & BIRDSELL, supra note 253, at 126-54.
255. See John G. Geer, The Effects of Presidential Debates on the Electorate's
Preferencesfor Candidates, 16 AM. POL. Q. 486, 494-96 (1988); Peter R. Schrott, Electoral
Consequences of "Winning" Televised Campaign Debates, 54 PUB. OPINION Q. 567, 583
(1990).
256. See Schrott, supra note 255, at 581, 583. In a longitudinal study of West German
debates between candidates for chancellor, Schrott found that "the winner of the debate
always receives a positive boost from that part of the audience [who thought he won]....
[T]he other candidates register declines in their overall evaluation." Id. at 576. In
examining the effects of American presidential candidate debates, Geer found that
"debates... can cause many cross-pressured and weakly committed individuals to change
their preference for president." Geer, supra note 255, at 495-96. He also reported that
"partisans became stronger supporters of their party's candidate following the debate."
Id. at 494. But see id. at 487 (noting that "[m]ost studies have shown that debates have
only a limited ability to influence the attitudes of the electorate, and hence the outcome of
elections") (citing David 0. Sears & Steven H. Chaffee, Uses and Effects of the 1976
Debates: An Overview of Empirical Studies, in THE GREAT DEBATES: CARTER VS.
FORD, 1976, at 223, 244 (Sidney Kraus ed., 1979) (explaining that debates were not critical
to the 1976 presidential campaign) and Paul R. Hagner & Leroy N. Rieselbach, The
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non-major-party candidates lack the resources to buy significant air
time and can be excluded from debates hosted by private entities,
they rely on debates sponsored by public television to gain
recognition. z 7
While the Forbes Court recognized the special role that debates
play in American political campaigns, 8 its reliance on the
conventional forum doctrine illuminates the greatest weaknesses of
the nonpublic forum analysis. 9 Justice Kennedy, who wrote the
Court's opinion in Forbes,previously had warned that the nonpublic
forum designation "leaves the government with almost unlimited
authority to restrict speech on its property by doing nothing more
than articulating a non-speech-related purpose for the area. '260 In
past public forum cases, the Court specifically worried about the
"lurking doubts about favoritism and sticky administrative problems
[that] might arise in parceling out limited space to eager
1

politicians.

26

By giving "a state-owned public television broadcaster" the
authority to determine which candidates would be invited to
participate in debates, 262 the Court jumped head-first into the
"lurking doubts" about which it was once concerned. In addition,
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion "ignored his own counsel" by
classifying debates as nonpublic fora.2 63 The Forbes Court started its
opinion by emphasizing the importance of editorial discretion in
Impact of the 1976 Presidential Debates: Conversion or Reinforcement?, in THE
PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES 157, 177 (George F. Bishop et al. eds., 1978) (finding that the
1976 presidential debates only bolstered voters' pre-established preferences and
concluding it was "doubtful that the debates played an important informational role within
the 1976 campaign)). In the most recent gubernatorial election in Minnesota, Reform
Party candidate Jesse Ventura's performance in live debates with his Republican and
Democratic opponents helped him win the election. See Britt Robson, Minnesota
Discontent and the Invasion of "The Body," NEWSDAY, Nov. 8, 1998, at B4, available in
1998 WL 2693084.
257. See Biskupic, supra note 44, at A2. For a discussion of one proposal to increase
candidates' access to the media by giving free air time, see Hundt, supra note 223, at 110010.
258. See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1640.
259. See infra notes 260-304 and accompanying text. The Court's decision in Forbes
has been criticized because it "presents a tautology"-a candidate is excluded from a
debate "because the forum is closed, and the forum is closed because [a candidate] is
excluded from the debate." James, supra note 44, at B15. Such rationale merely "begs the
question Forbes presents to the court." Id.
260. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 695
(1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgments).
261. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974) (plurality opinion).
262. Forbes,118 S. Ct. at 1637.
263. James, supra note 44, at B15.
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broadcast journalism. 254 The Court recognized that the discretion of
public television stations to invite candidates to its televised debates
was an "exception" that would be subject to the "scrutiny" of the
Court's nonpublic forum standards.2 65 Despite this exception, the
Court's "scrutiny" of nonpublic fora retains broad discretion for
government officials, in this case state employed broadcasters. 6
Such discretion gives public television stations wider latitude than
private stations in excluding candidates from televised debates.261
Some journalists applauded the discretion that the Court
afforded AETC and other public television stations26 to serve as
"gatekeepers" to determine what would be aired on their stations
and decide who could appear in their debates.2

69

After the Forbes

decision was issued, one Arkansas newspaper wrote that it would
prefer to leave the decision "to those organizing the debate than to
the kind of bureaucrats who draw up government forms." 270 That
newspaper, however, failed to recognize that such a distinction might
not exist because "those organizing the debate" were also state
employees.271 The Forbes Court also "seriously underestimate[d] the
importance of the difference between private and public ownership
of broadcast facilities." 272
264. See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1639. In dicta, the Court established that public
television stations would enjoy the same editorial discretion that private stations have in
controlling their programming and that such programming is not subject to public forum
analysis. See id. at 1640.
265. Id.
266. See supra notes 235-39 and accompanying text.
267. Following Forbes, public television stations can exclude candidates from political
debates as long as the exclusions are not based on the candidates' opinions and are
"reasonable in light of the purpose of the property." Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1643 (citation
omitted). The Court's holding permits public stations to base their decisions on which
candidates can participate on criteria that are neither pre-established nor objective. But
cf 11 C.F.R. § 110.13(c) (1998) (requiring private television stations to use "preestablished objective criteria to determine which candidates may participate in [the]
debate").
268. See Fellone, supra note 1, at B7; Paul Greenberg, Editorial, A Victory for Public
TV and Public Debate,TULSA WORLD (Okla.), May 30, 1998, at 16.
269. See Fellone, supranote 1, at B7.
270. Editorial, A Victory for Debate; and for Public Television, ARK. DEMOCRATGAZETrE, May 24, 1998, at J4, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arkdem File. This
argument would carry greater weight if public television journalists were subject to the
same regulatory scrutiny as private journalists when determining which candidates will be
invited to participate in debates. Unfortunately, they are not. See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at
1645-46 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
271. Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 93 F.3d 497, 505 (8th Cir. 1996)
(noting that "the people making this judgment were not ordinary journalists: they were
employees of government"), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 1633 (1998).
272- Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1646 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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While public television stations in other states may be governed
differently, Arkansas's public television station is an arm of the state
government.2 73 Its commissioners are "appointed by the Governor
with the advice and consent of the Senate,"2 74 and its employees are
paid by the state. 75 In addition, AETC receives funding through
Arkansas's General Education Fund,27 6 and the station has the power
of eminent domain.277 Like other Arkansas state agencies, AETC is
obligated to submit an annual report to the state's Legislative
Council.278
Although the Forbes Court held that the decision to exclude
Forbes was a "reasonable, viewpoint-neutral exercise of journalistic
discretion,"279 it may have left the door wide open for abuse.
Naturally, journalists' decisions are colored by partisan beliefs."0 By
essentially giving public television stations free reign to select which
candidates appear in debates, the Forbes Court did not prevent these
partisan beliefs from creeping into the selection process.2 1 While
such partisanship may be acceptable for private journalists, it
becomes troublesome when exercised by public employees. 2M
273. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-3-101 (Michie 1993) (creating AETC); Arkansas
Educational Telecommunications Network (visited Nov. 12, 1998) <http://www.aetn.org>
(stating that "AETN is an Arkansas state agency").
274. ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-3-102 (b)(1) (Michie 1993).
275. See id § 6-3-110 (d) (Michie 1993).
276. See id. § 19-5-304 (3)(A) (Michie 1993).
277. See id. § 6-3-113 (Michie 1993).
278. See id. § 25-1-105 (g)(4) (Michie 1993).
279. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1644.
280. See Thomas E. Patterson & Wolfgang Donsbach, News Decisions: Journalistsas
PartisanActors, 13 POL. COMM. 455, 465 (1996). Patterson and Donsbach found that
"partisanship can and does intrude on news decisions, even among journalists who are
conscientiously committed to a code of strict neutrality.... [T]heir partisan
predispositions affect the choices they make, from the stories they select to the headlines
they write." Id. at 466. They also found that the partisanship of American broadcasters in
local markets was not significantly correlated to news decisions. See id. at 464. This
finding may not be relevant in the context of AETC and other public television stations
which are not local, but rather are operated statewide. Patterson and Donsbach only
considered national and local (i.e., citywide) media and found that in America and four
other countries, "[p]artisanship intrudes on news decisions to a measurable degree among
both print and broadcast journalists at both the national and local levels." Id. at 463.
281. See supra note 235 (discussing the deference accorded to government officials in
nonpublic fora).
282- As Justice Stevens warned in his Forbes dissent, "[b]ecause AETC is owned by
the State, deference to its interest in making ad hoc decisions about the political content of
its programs necessarily increases the risk of government censorship and propaganda in a
way that protection of privately owned broadcasters does not." Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1647
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
Partisanship by private journalists is more clearly acceptable under the First
Amendment. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (rejecting
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Journalists' partisanship in the context of candidate debates is even

more disturbing because such partisanship may affect debates twice:
Journalists not only decide who gets to participate in debates but also
can determine who "wins" through post-debate analysis.Y3 Given the
impact of "winning" a debate on the outcome of elections,
journalists' decision-making and analysis are more critical than the
Court recognized in Forbes.
While the Court's concern about viewpoint discrimination in
nonpublic fora traditionally focuses on the purposes for restricting
access to the forum, excluding qualified candidates from public
television debates may have significant discriminatory consequences.

candidate's claim that he had a right of access to space in a private newspaper to respond
to editorial criticism); CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 113 (1973)
(recognizing that "no private individual or group has a right to command the use of
broadcast facilities"); Belluso v. Turner Communications Corp., 63 F.2d 393, 398-99 (5th
Cir. 1980) (recognizing that the "First Amendment is a restraint on government, not on
private persons,... [and that the] First Amendment does not guarantee every individual a
right of access to broadcasting"); Maher v. Sun Publications, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 353, 356-57
(D. Kan. 1978) (holding that a private newspaper can exclude a candidate from its debate
even if the debate is televised). Nevertheless, private journalists' partisanship in political
debates has been checked by federal regulations requiring the sponsoring organization to
"use pre-established objective criteria to determine which candidates may participate in a
debate." 11 C.F.R. § 110.13(c) (1998). Federal regulations also forbid private stations
from using "nomination by a particular political party as the sole objective criterion to
determine whether to include a candidate in a debate." Id.
On the other hand, after Forbes, public television stations can exclude any candidate
if the exclusion is reasonable and is not based on the candidate's views. See Forbes, 118 S.
Ct. at 1644. This standard for exclusion permits public television stations to make ad hoc
decisions, as opposed to the "pre-established criteria" private stations must use when
selecting candidates. See id. at 1645 (Stevens, J., dissenting). When such ad hoc decisions
are made, partisanship is more likely to creep into a journalist's selection, especially
without pre-established objective criteria to check partisanship. Furthermore, the
presumably objective "reasonableness" requirement used by the courts in nonpublic
forum cases has allowed the state to have substantial discretion when excluding potential
speakers. See supra notes 241-46 and accompanying text. Finally, public television
stations are not prohibited by the regulation disallowing party affiliation to be the "sole
objective criteria." See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1645 (Stevens, J., dissenting); 11 C.F.R.
§ 110.13(c). The "political viability" standard used by AETC in Forbes served as a de
facto reliance on membership in one of the two major political parties as the sole criteria
for excluding a candidate. See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1648 n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(explaining that the only non-major-party candidate was excluded from the AETC
debates). At a minimum, public television stations should be asked to comply with the
same regulations that apply to private broadcasters.
283. Studies have demonstrated that journalists play a significant role in determining
how voters interpret who won a particular debate. See Geer, supra note 255, at 488 (citing
Gladys Engel Lang & Kurt Lang, The Formulation of Public Opinion: Direct and
Mediated Effects of the First Debate, in THE PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES 61, 79-80 (George
F. Bishop et al. eds., 1978)).
284. See Post, supra note 85, at 1824.
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Allowing public television stations to limit debates to the major party
candidates could "'skew the outcome of elections.' "I' In addition,
such limits implicitly endorse America's two-party political system by
allowing only Republican and Democratic candidates to appear in
debates sponsored by state agencies. 6 Furthermore, by shutting
independent and third-party candidates out of public television
debates, the Court's decision in Forbes diminishes the impact that
non-major-party candidates can have on elections and the political
process.m
Although requiring public television stations to include third
party candidates may create logistical problems, such problems
should not justify allowing stations to exclude a candidate simply
because a state-employed journalist decides the candidate is not
The numerical concerns the
politically viable or newsworthy.28
present in any Arkansas
not
Court raised in Forbes were
congressional election in 1992, where the largest number of
candidates running for any given seat was three. 89 Furthermore, the
logistical and numerical problems the Court identified could be
addressed appropriately through the type of reasonable time, place,
and manner regulations that have been upheld in other cases.2 91
Certainly, public television stations could design debate formats to
accommodate three (or more) candidates. Once candidates are
deemed by the state to be legally qualified, there should be no
285. Biskupic, supra note 44, at A2 (quoting Professor James Raskin, who represented
Ross Perot's 1996 presidential campaign and filed a friend of the court brief in support of
Forbes).
286. See id.
287. See Anderson, supra note 249, at B7; James, supra note 44, at B15. John
Anderson has fought his own legal battle for the rights of independent candidates. See
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) (rejecting Ohio's early filing deadline for
independent presidential candidates).
288. As Forbes himself explained, allowing candidates to be excluded because
government employees do not consider them to be viable is "[like Animal Farm [where]
some are more equal than others. If I'm no good, the ones that should decide that are the
people themselves, not these bureaucrats." Williams, supra note 14; see also Forbes v.
Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 93 F.3d 497, 504 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting that Forbes's
viability "was, ultimately, a judgment to be made by the people"), rev'd, 118 S.Ct. 1633
(1998).
289. See Election Results Table, supra note 76, at A34. In 1998, the largest race for a
congressional seat in Arkansas was among three candidates as well. See Rachel O'Neal,
Candidates for Arkansas' District, State, and National Offices, ARK. DEMOCRATGAZETrE, Apr. 5, 1998, at A22, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arkdem File.
290. See, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983); see also infra notes 305-20
and accompanying text (discussing a possible framework for evaluating First Amendment
cases that involve public property that is not readily placed within the public forum
doctrine).
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difference between them in the eyes of the state, whether they are
or Independents.29 1
Republicans, Democrats, Libertarians,
Furthermore, by including all legally qualified candidates, public
television stations would avoid "lurking doubts about favoritism. ''29
Although the Forbes Court feared that public television stations
would cease holding debates if forced to invite all candidates to
participate, the Court did not explain why public television stations
need to host political candidate debates. Public stations are not the
only forums in which candidate debates are held.293 For example,
during Nebraska's 1996 senatorial campaign, the major party
candidates debated several other times in debates hosted by private
organizations. 94 During the 1992 campaign in Arkansas's Third
Congressional District, the two major party candidates were able to
participate in a debate broadcast by a private television station.2 95
While the Court may be correct in stating that more debates will
occur if public television stations host debates,296 it does not explain
291. See Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 93 F.3d at 504; see also Oakley,
supra note 76, at B7 (writing that "if public TV wants to provide a forum, that forum
should be entirely open"). Justice Blackmun's dissent in Cornelius reminded the Court
that "[a]ccess to government property permits the use of the less costly means of
communication so 'essential to the poorly financed causes of little people' and 'allow[s]
challenge to governmental action at its locus.'" Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense &
Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 815 (1985) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Martin v.
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943); Ronald A. Cass, First Amendment Access to
Government Facilities,65 VA. L. REV. 1287, 1288 (1979)). The Arkansas state legislature
has not recognized any difference between major party candidates and minor party or
independent candidates. Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-7-102 (Michie 1993) (discussing
how candidates of political parties qualify for a general election in Arkansas), with ARK.
CODE ANN. § 7-7-103 (Michie 1993) (discussing how independent candidates qualify for
general elections in Arkansas).
292. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298,304 (1974) (plurality opinion).
293. As Oakley explains, "[i]n an age when cable and satellite TV provide for hundreds
of channels, there are plenty of other options for public debate where private editorial
judgment can be used to exclude fringe candidates." Oakley, supra note 76, at B7.
294. See C. David Kotok, Hagel-Nelson Debate Turns to Verbal War, OMAHA WORLDHERALD, Sept. 7, 1996, at 1, availablein 1996 WL 6030662; C. David Kotok, Nelson, Hagel
Debate Tonight Under Looser Format, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Sept. 29, 1996, at 4B,
available in 1996 WL 6032776; C. David Kotok, Nelson, Hagel Lock Horns over Issues:
Hour Forum Is BroadcastAcross State, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Aug. 25, 1996, at 1A,
available in 1996 WL 6029007; Kotok, supra note 66, at 1; Nelson, Hagel Debate Planned
for Hastings, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, July 31, 1996, at 23, available in 1996 WL
6026189.
295. See Hutchinson Says Congress Needs Minister More than Another Lawyer,
ASSOCIATED PRESS POL. SERV., Oct. 15, 1992, available in 1992 WL 5147066. It is worth
noting that Forbes did not participate in the debate. See id.
296. See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1643. Schauer suggests that "limiting participation in the
most salient of electoral discourse [candidate debates] has the effect of narrowing political
discourse generally, a consequence seemingly at odds with the larger goals of a free speech
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why the government has an interest in hosting debates at all. In other
cases where the Court has determined that public property is a
nonpublic forum, the underlying justification has been that the
government must protect the property for its intended use. This
justification applies from the mailboxes that facilitate the
communication necessary for teachers297 to the airport terminals that
ensure that passengers arrive to their planes on time.298 In contrast,
the Forbes Court explained that the purposes of a debate sponsored
by a government agency are to educate the public about its choices
for a particular office "with minimal intrusion from the broadcaster"
and to promote the democracy upon which our government is
founded. 99 To these ends, the public would arguably be better
served by public television debates that include all candidates who
have legally qualified under laws passed by the state legislatures,0 0
rather than debates limited to candidates whom a state agency
considers "viable." ''
As the Perry Court explained, the "'First
Amendment does not guarantee access to property simply because it
is owned or controlled by the government.' ,0 Likewise, as Justice
Stevens explained in his Forbes dissent: "A state-owned broadcaster
need not plan, sponsor, and conduct political debates... . 303 If
system." Schauer, supra note 205, at 87 n.2; see also Corporation for Public Broadcasting,
Local Debate Night Helps Viewers Choose Candidates (visited Nov. 12, 1998)
<http://www.cpb.orgllibrary/researchnotes/lrn110rnllO.html>
(discussing efforts to
broadcast more debates on public television in the 1998 elections); Karen Everhart
Bedford, Election 98 Project Zooms in on Local Contests (visited Nov. 12, 1998)
<http://www.current.orglel/el819d.html> (discussing expanded coverage of local elections
on public television during the 1998 mid-term elections).
297. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,47-48 (1983).
298. See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 68283 (1992).
299. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1640.
300. By only including major party candidates, public television debates mirror their
privately sponsored counterparts. If public television stations included all legally-qualified
candidates, they would serve a unique function by providing a forum through which
citizens could evaluate all of the candidates for whom they will have an opportunity to
vote on election day. Following the decision in Forbes,public television has more latitude
to exclude candidates from debates than private stations. See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1645
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
301. The state's citizens are the best judges of political viability. See Forbes v.
Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 93 F.3d 497, 504-05 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 118 S. Ct.
1633 (1998). Under Arkansas law, the state merely determines who has qualified to be a
candidate, not which candidates actually have a good chance of winning the election. See
ARK. CODE. ANN. §§ 7-7-102, -103 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1997). As such, legal
qualification should be the only measure of "viability" recognized by the state.
302. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 (quoting United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh
Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114,129 (1981)).
303. Forbes, 118 S.Ct. at 1647 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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public stations chose not to host debates merely because they were
obliged to invite all legally qualified candidates, their choice would
be unfortunate. At least such a choice would raise no "lurking
doubts about favoritism," and "sticky administrative problems"
would not' '13° "arise in parceling out limited space to eager

politicians.

In evaluating the issues raised by Forbes's claim, the Court could
have steered clear of the "circuitous route" carved out by the modern
public forum doctrine 30 5 by returning to the roots of the public forum
as expressed by Professor Kalven 3 6 and embodied in Grayned3 7 and

Mosley0 s by espousing a balancing test that weighs the individual's
interest in speech against the normal use of the public property.
Kalven likened the government's role to that of a moderator using
"reasonable parliamentary rules" to preside over a town hall
meeting.30 9 As the Court held in Grayned, in cases involving public

speech on public property, the central issue "is whether the manner
of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a
particular place at a particular time."310 To this end, the government
304. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974) (plurality opinion).
Such "lurking doubts" also could have been avoided if the Court had stipulated that public
television stations that sponsor candidate debates should use "'pre-established objective
criteria to determine which candidates may participate.'" Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1645
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting 11 C.F.R. § 110.13(c) (1998)). Even if public television
stations were required to invite all qualified candidates to debates they sponsored, the
stations might still be able to circumvent the rule by simply broadcasting debates between
major party candidates that have been sponsored by private organizations. See Maher v.
Sun Publications, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 353, 356-57 (D. Kan. 1978) (noting that if nonbroadcast entities host debates and the debates are covered live by television stations, such
coverage is exempt from the Federal Communications Act's equal time provision because
it is considered "on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events").
305. James, supra note 44, at B15; see also Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1648 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the facts of Forbes "may not fit squarely within our public forum
analysis"). Many commentators have presented alternative frameworks with which to
consider issues raised by citizens' efforts to express themselves freely in public places. See,
e.g., Dienes, supra note 96, at 121 (proposing that the Court should compare the "value of
granting access ... to the costs of the government permitting access"); Farber & Nowak,
supra note 205, at 1240 (advocating a "focused balancing" approach); Gey, supra note 162,
at 1576 (suggesting that the doctrine be recast in terms of significant interference with the
intended use of the property at issue). For an interesting consideration of Forbes as a
"hintG of an institutionally focused approach to government enterprise free speech cases,"
see Schauer, supra note 205, at 87-92, 97-120.
306. See supranotes 91-100 and accompanying text.
307. See supranotes 109-18 and accompanying text.
308. See supra notes 119-25 and accompanying text.
309. Kalven, supra note 86, at 23-25 (citing MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 97, at 24-28
(1960)).
310. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972); see also Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 822 (1985) (Blackmun, J.,
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should be permitted to promulgate reasonable time, place, and
manner regulations regarding public property. 1' Since the normal
activity of a political debate is for candidates to discuss relevant
issues, non-major-party candidates such as Forbes should be included
in public television debates under Grayned. The government agency
hosting a debate simply should not be granted the authority to
exclude candidates from a forum which serves as the candidates'
312
"town hall.1
According to Mosley, when First Amendment interests are at
stake, government regulations should be subject to the strict scrutiny
of the Court."3 Professor Kalven and the Grayned Court agreed that
free expression in public places could only face government
restriction for "weighty reasons. '314 Therefore, the government "may
not select which issues are worth discussing or debating. '315 In
Mosley, the Court reasoned that if the government gave labor
picketers a right to disrupt schools, then other picketers should be
granted the same protection without regard to what they were
protesting.3 6 Similarly, in Forbes, once the government decided that
a debate would be a good use for public television resources, it
should not have been permitted to limit which candidates
participated based on which constituencies the candidates
represented or how much support their causes had garnered.317
AETC's concerns of logistical burdens and potential educational
value, although important, hardly represent the "weighty reasons"
Professor Kalven described and probably would not survive the
Court's strict scrutiny.1 8
Finally, as Justice Stevens pointed out, political debates
sponsored by state-owned television stations do "not squarely fit

dissenting) (noting that the Court had "abandon[ed] the compatibility test that always has
served as a threshold indicator"); Stone, supra note 207, at 93-94 (arguing for a return to
the Graynedcompatibility standard).
311. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 115; Kalven, supra note 86, at 28.
312. See Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 93 F.3d 497, 504 (8th Cir.
1996), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 1633 (1998).
313. See Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 98-99 (1972).
314. Grayned,408 U.S. at 115; Kalven, supra note 86, at 21.
315. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96.
316. See id. at 101-02.
317. See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1633,1648 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
318. Cf United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177-80, 183-84 (holding that sidewalks
surrounding the Supreme Court building constitute a public forum and a prohibition
against carrying signs, banners, or devices on the public sidewalks surrounding the
building is not narrowly tailored and does not serve a significant government interest).
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within [the Court's] public forum analysis. 319 Professor Kalven's
public forum was never meant to be used in such a context, 320 yet a
return to Professor Kalven's initial framework could have been used
as a guide to analyze Forbes's First Amendment interests. The use of
a balancing test would allow the Court to have the flexibility it needs
to facilitate efficient government action while maintaining the
integrity of the speech rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
In the end, the decision in Forbes, like the decision in other
nonpublic forum cases, ignores Professor Kalven's call for "the
thumb of the Court [to] be on the speech side of the scales."3 21 The
Forbes Court never seriously considered the speech being sacrificed
by not allowing Forbes to participate in the AETC debate.32 Rather,
the Court focused on justifying why AETC should have the power to
exclude him. 3 In this regard, the Court appears to value the
discretion of government employees over the interest of a candidate
to engage in a debate sponsored by a state agency. This conclusion
signifies how far the Court has shifted from Kalven's original
conception and how speech-restrictive the public forum doctrine has
become.
The Court's use of the public forum doctrine in Forbes stands as
the most recent example of the "problem of formidable practical
difficulty" presented by the public forum concept. 324 The current
doctrine's rigid classification of property overlooks the value of free
expression in public places while allowing government officials to
have nearly unfettered discretion in restricting such expression. The
Court should consider returning to the theoretical roots of the forum
doctrine by weighing society's interest in speech against the normal
use of the public property. By allowing the government to exclude a
legally qualified candidate from participating in a state-sponsored
political debate, the Court has deprived voters of an opportunity to
watch a "debate on public issues [that is truly] uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open" and, consequently, of an opportunity to make a fully
informed choice in their elections. 321
319. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1648 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
320. When Kalven initially wrote about the public forum, he sought to address "mass
protest in public places." Kalven, supra note 86, at 11.
321. Id.at 28.
322- See Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1641-44 ("The issue ... is whether the debate was a
designated forum or a nonpublic forum.").
323. See id. (explaining that labeling the debate a limited public forum "would place a
severe burden upon public broadcasters who air candidates' views").
324. Kalven, supra note 86, at 12.
325. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,270 (1964).
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In the 1998 election, Ralph Forbes ran for congress again in
Arkansas's Third District.3 6 As in the past, AETC planned to host
debates for candidates in each of Arkansas's congressional districts.327
Perhaps recognizing the value of a more inclusive debate, AETC
invited Forbes to participate.3 8 Ironically, Forbes's opponent,
incumbent Representative Asa Hutchinson, declined to participate.2 9
MICHAEL L. BERRY

326. See Lemons, supra note 44, at Al. Forbes ran as a candidate from the Reform
Party "against the party's wishes." A Reform Party Candidate Challenging Republican
... ,ASSOCIATED PRESS POL. SERV., Nov. 3,1998, available in 1998 WL 7462220; see also
Candidates for Arkansas' District, State, and National Offices, ARK. DEMOCRATGAZETTE, Apr. 5, 1998, at A22, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arkdem File.
327. See David A. Lieb, The Debate May Never Happen, but Ralph Forbes ....
ASSOCIATED PRESS POL. SERV., Sept. 4,1998, availablein 1998 WL 7442545.
328. See id
329. See id. Subsequently, AETC gave Forbes 10 minutes of free air time. See Berry
Unopposed, Hutchinson Faces No DemocratOpposition, ASSOCIATED PRESS POL. SERV.,
Oct. 26, 1998, available in 1998 WL 7459292. United States Representative Asa
Hutchinson is the brother of Forbes's 1992 opponent, current Senator Tim Hutchinson.
See Terry McNeal, As A Jury, Senate is Full of Conflicts: Lawmakers Vow Impartiality
Despite PersonalConnections,WASH. POST, Jan. 15,1999, at A18.

